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Prior Restraints on the Media
and the Right to a Fair Trial:
A Proposal for a New Standard
BY ALBERrO BERNABE=RIEFKOHL*

INTRODUCTION

The series of events leading to the arrest and trial of former
football star O.J. Simpson captured the attention of the American
public to a degree rarely seen in recent years. The notoriety of the
defendant and the disturbing nature of the crime contributed to its

appeal. However, it was probably the media coverage, including live
coverage by all national network stations of the police car chase which
led to Simpson's arrest, that allowed the case to captivate the American public in such a powerful way. On the other hand, with the murder
investigation culminating in a trial of Simpson, many became worried

that media coverage would make it difficult for him to receive a fair
trial.' A poll conducted by CBS News concluded that eighty-seven
percent of the people polled thought the murder trial was getting too
much media coverage.2 Similarly, eighty-six percent of those polled
by the American Bar Association Journal stated that the coverage had

made them more aware of the fact that the media could affect the
defendant's right to a fair trial.3 Given this danger, and given their

duty to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial,4 courts must ascer* AssistantProfessor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. 1984, Princeton
University; J.D. 1987, University of Puerto Rico Law School; LL.M. 1994, Temple
University. The author would like to thank Professor Sandy Olken for his comments and
suggestions on various rough drafts of this Article, and Beth Pusateri, Mark Weissburg,
Jon Buck, and Adrian Mendoza for their invaluable research assistance.
I Although not referring to the O.J. Simpson trial in particular, author Eileen
Tanielian has concluded that because of media coverage "[w]hat was once envisioned to
be a guarantee of impartiality for the defendant has evolved into a guarantee of prejudice
...." Eileen F. Tanielian, Battle of The Privileges: First Amendment vs. Sixth
Amendment, 10 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 215, 215 (1990).
2 CBS News (CBS television broadcast, July 6, 1994).
Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52, 54.
4See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (discussing due process
requirements for a fair trial in the face of media publicity). For a discussion of the court's
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tain whether they can exercise some control over the media coverage of
high profile trials. Evidently, to solve these conflicts 5 courts must
balance the First Amendment rights of the press6 with the Sixth Amendment rights7 of criminal defendants.
duty to protect the right to a fair trial, see infra notes 67-100 and accompanying text.
' The relationship between the media and the judicial system can threaten the
fairness of the judicial process and create difficult conflicts. This possibility is evidenced
by the existence of "bar-media" committees in many communities. These committees
usually exist to establish mechanisms which alleviate the tensions that media coverage
creates on thejudicial system. SeeJOHND. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES,
RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 241 (1993). For example, the media's right of
access to judicial proceedings under Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (II), 478 U.S.
1, 2 (1986), Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984), and
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), may clash with a witness's
desire for privacy or the state's interest in protecting the identity of juvenile offenders.
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the Court held that
a statute imposing mandatory exclusion of the public and the press from trial testimony
of minors who are victims of sexual abuse was unconstitutional. Id. at 610-11. The Court
held that the interests in protecting the privacy of a minor witness in a child sex abuse
case to prevent further trauma and to encourage other victims to come forward were not
sufficient to defeat the presumption of openness in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 607-09.
Such a presumption would be defeated only if a compelling state interest required the
closure order, and if the order were narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 607.
Also, in most jurisdictions, delinquency proceedings against juveniles are closed to the
media. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ACCESS TO JUVENILE
COURTS 2 (Fall 1991). Arguably, closure is needed to protect the identity of the juvenile,
and to prevent publicity from interfering with his rehabilitation. In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125,
1129 (Vt. 1981) (holding that publication of a youth's name could impair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system). It has also been claimed that the media's access
to judicial records clashes with a rape victim's right to privacy. In Cox Broadcasting v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975), however, the Court held that when a television
broadcasting company legally obtains the name of a rape victim from public judicial
records the state cannot impose criminal sanctions for the accurate publication of that
name. Similarly, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989), the Court held that
a plaintiff cannot recover for invasion of privacy from a media defendant for the
publication of previously secret information regarding a rape victim, and that media
coverage makes it impossible for a defendant to get a fair trial.
6 The First Amendment states in part that "Congress shall make no law
...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ..... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'

The Sixth Amendment guarantees:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury... and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that the right to a fair
trial includes "the principle that 'one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or
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On the one hand, the First Amendment protects media coverage of
criminal matters and of the judicial system because press coverage is a
valuable component of our democratic form of government.8 This is part
of the reasoning behind the First Amendment's protection of freedom of
the press. 9 A better informed public can contribute more to the imple-

innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on
the grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances
not adduced as proof at trial."' Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (citing
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)).
1 Needless to say, news programs and articles about murder investigations, crime,
and punishment are also popular and profitable. A quick glance at the television listings
for a week during the summer showed such shows as Inside Edition, Hard Copy, A
CurrentAffair,People'sCourt,The Untouchables,DarkJusticeNYPDBlue, Night Court,
Cops, Dragnet,DiagnosisMurder, Under Suspicion, New York Undercover,Hill Street
Blues, Silk Stalkings, MurderShe Wrote, The Rockford Files, Columbo, Real Stories of
the Highway Patrol,and even old reruns of Charlie'sAngels. Also, the fascination with
crime and criminal justice has attracted the attention of television movie producers, who
just recently offered, among other examples, the following: In theLine ofDuty: Ambush
in Waco (NBC television broadcast, May 23, 1993), a dramatization of the FBI's
intervention at the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco, Texas just weeks after the
incident; three different versions of Amy Fisher's story (Amy Fisher:My Story (NBC
television broadcast, Dec. 28, 1992); Casualtiesof Love: The Long Island Lolita Story
(CBS television broadcast, Jan. 3, 1993); and The Amy FisherStory (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 3, 1993)); and a movie version of the life of a high school cheerleader's
mother who was accused of murdering her daughter's rival, called The Positively True
AdventuresoftheAlleged Texas Cheerleader-MurderingMom(HBO television broadcast,
Apr. 10, 1993). In fact, this HBO movie was the subject of an attempted prior restraint.
Ruth Piller, Judge Won't Block Showing of Pompom Mom TV Movie, HOUS. CHRON.,
Apr. 9, 1993, at C6. Criminal justice enthusiasts can also spend all day watching Court
TV, a cable television station which dedicates all of its air time to broadcasting trials.
Since its creation in 1991, Court TV has reached an average of 350,000 viewers a day,
a larger audience than daytime Cable News Network ("CNN"). The Talk ofthe Town,
NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 1994, at 27. "Court TV is based on a simple notion, even a
primitive one: crime, scandal, and degradation make good TV." Id. at 28. Tales of
murder, money, and race help make the case for coverage of trials. Id. at 27. For some
examples of murder trials that have attracted extensive media attention, see generally
PETER E. KANE, MURDER, COURTS, AND THE PRESS (1989).
9 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis:Libertarianand Republican
JustificationsforFree Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451 (1987) (comparing Justice Holmes'
"marketplace of ideas" justification for free speech with Justice Brandeis' "civic virtue"
justification). There is not much record of the debates concerning the meaning of this
Amendment in the House and Senate. See Const. of the United States: Analysis &
Interpretation,S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 936 (1973). Indeed, the material
available to determine the intent of the framers is capable of divergent interpretations. See
infranote 43. Given the ambiguity of the historical research and the recent interpretations
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mentation of solutions to the problem of crime."0 Also, the information

helps make government institutions more accountable. If the public is
going to perform its self-governing function, it must be able to receive
information about how the government works. Yet, given modem social

and governmental structures, it is doubtful that the average citizen has the
ability or the time to perform this task alone. It is the press that has taken
on the role of surrogates to the public. It is through the press that citizens

can participate in self-governance. The First Amendment's protection of
freedom of the press, therefore, serves the media as well as the individu-

als who depend on it to fulfill the values of freedom of expression,

by the Supreme Court, it is now clear that, notwithstanding the language of the
Amendment, its protections are not absolute. Partly for this reason, the Amendment has
generated a vast amount of literature that tries to develop a theory of its basis and
meaning.
Meiklejohn has been the most commonly cited proponent of the model that interprets
the First Amendment as a method of protecting and encouraging self-government by the
public. See also Martin Redish, Self-Realization.Democracyand Freedom ofExpression:
A Reply to ProfessorBaker,130 U. PA. L. REv. 678 (1982) (arguing that free speech
enhances the individual's contribution to the social welfare and, thus, to his selffulfillment); Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593
(1982) (positing that the constitutional guarantee of free speech aids in the individuals
development of autonomy and human development).
Another influential approach to the First Amendment has been the "marketplace of
ideas" model. According to this model, the function of the First Amendment is to
guarantee the competition of ideas. This model has been traced back to JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGITICA (AMS Press 1971). The notion of the competition of ideas was later
developed by John Stuart Mill in ON LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION (Hackett
Publishing Co. 1978) (1859). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes adopted the model and used
it to argue his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
See generally,RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at 2-13, 2-14 (1994).
A third model values the protection of free speech as a contribution to the fulfillment
of an individual's personal liberty. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment
Freedom ofSpeech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1991). Yet, the First Amendment is perhaps
better understood as a combination of all of these ideas. See, e.g., THOMAS EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966) (arguing that the First
Amendment protection of free speechis necessary(1) to assure individual self-fulfillment,
(2) as a means to attain the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by the
members of society in social and political decision-making, and (4) as a method to keep
the balance between stability and change in society). In his concurring opinion in Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), Justice Brandeis advocated freedom of speech
as "indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth" and as essential to a stable
government and to political change. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
,o See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977); see generallyMEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9.
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participation in democratic government, and self-realization." This is
why speech that comments on governmental entities or that provides
more knowledge of the government and the way it works is at the core
of the First Amendment's protection of freedom of the press.'2 In the
case of speech about the judicial process, the fact that the media has
access to criminal trials also helps protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial. 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that public
" See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9.
12"Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,

there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that amendment was to
protect the free discussionof governmental affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966), quotedin Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,838 (1978).
"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of
self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). The Framers "gave
into our keeping the value of preserving free expression and, in particular, the preservation
of political expression, which is commonly conceded to be the value at the core of [the
First Amendment]." Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the function of the press in our
society. As early as the 1930s the Court explained:
The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country... have shed and
continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than
any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the
most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than
with grave concern.
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). See also Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359,369 (1931) (reversingthe defendant's criminal conviction based
on a vague statute which could be interpreted to restrict his right to participate in political
discussion).
13The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the guarantee of a public trial
was created for the benefit of the defendant. In In re Oliver,for example, the Court held
that a secret contempt trial violated the defendant's right to a public trial under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 333 U.S. 257, 272-73 (1948). The Court stated: "The right to a
public trial has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject
to contempt review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse ofjudicial power." In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965), the Court again
recognized that the purpose of the requirement of a public trial exists to guarantee a fair
trial for the accused.
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), Chief Justice Burger
announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion, joined by Justices White and
Stevens, asserting that criminal trials are presumptively open to the public and the media,
in part because the openness itself acts as an assurance of fairness for all concerned. Id.
at 570, 573. In a separate concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed and
declared: "Publicity serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial (and,
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scrutiny of criminal trials is an effective restraint on possible abuse of
judicial power which enhances the quality and integrity of the process,
with benefits to both the defendant and society as a whole. 4
On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment's right to a fair trial for a
criminal defendant 5 is recognized as one of the "most fundamental of
all freedoms, 1 6 essential "to the preservation and enjoyment of all other
rights."' 7 The right to a fair trial includes the defendant's right to have

his guilt determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial,
and not on the grounds of "official suspicion, indictment, continued

custody or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial."'" Trial
indeed, the judicial) process. Open trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts
of ourjudicial system to assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of
guilt or innocence." Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (II), 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) ("The right to an open public trial is a shared
right of the accused and the public, the common concern being the assurance of
fairness."); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) ("Openness
thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness
so essential to public confidence in the system.").
,4For example, in In re Oliver,the Court recognized that while the right to a public
trial is guaranteed to the accused, publicity also provides various benefits to the public,
including the fact that through public trials the public learns about the government. In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.24. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966), the
Court stated: "The press does not just publish information about trials, but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial process to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism." In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,49192 (1975), the Court stated:
Great responsibility is ...

placed upon the news media to report fully and

accurately the proceedings of government, ... and documents open to the
public are the basic data of governmental operations. Without the information
provided by the press most of us and many of our representatives would be
unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of
government generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the
function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to
bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration ofjustice.
See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
"5See supranote 7.
16Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
7

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976) (Brennan, J., with
Stewart and Marshall, JJ., concurring in judgment).
" Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478, 485 (1978)). Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated: "Few, if any, interests under the
Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by 'impartial' jurors, and
an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that fundamental right."
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting as
to Part III). Witness credibility can also become a problem when it is disclosed that the
press has paid witnesses generous amounts of money for information in a case. For a
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courts have a duty to protect this right.' 9 However, it has also been
recognized that the right to a fair trial does not guarantee a perfect
trial and that the press must be provided "maximum freedom" to carry
out its essential and important function of informing the public about the

judicial process."
discussion of this problem, see Robert S. Stephen, PrejudicialPublicitySurroundinga
Criminal Trial: What a Trial Court Can Do to Ensure a FairTrial in the Face of a
"Media Circus",26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1063, 1103 (1992).
In 1994, California enacted what was believed to be the first example of a law
criminalizing the sale of evidence. A new section was added to the state's penal code
which made it a crime for jurors or witnesses to provide information for compensation.
Witnesses are bound for one year from the time of the criminal act or until there is a final
judgment; jurors are bound for ninety days after being discharged. "Trashfor Cash"
Outlawedin California,NAT'L L.J., Oct. 10, 1994, at Al0. On April 9, 1995, one of the
oustedjurors from the O.J. Simpson trial and Dove Books filed a lawsuit against state and
local law enforcement officials in federal district court seeking a declaration that the law
abridges freedom of speech and of the press. See Gail D. Cox, Ex-Simpson JurorSeeks
to Cash In, NAT'L L.J., May 1, 1995, at A13. On May 22, 1995 the court held a hearing
to decide plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment and held that the statute was unconstitutional. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Lungren, No.
95-2570, 1995 WL 432631 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 1995). The court held that the law
operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint and that the state failed to show a
compelling state interest to support it. Id. at *3. It also held that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at *5. For these reasons, the court permanently enjoined
the Office of the District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles from enforcing the
statute. Id. at *6.
19See infra notes 67-136 and accompanying text. Through a series of decisions in
the 1960s, the Supreme Court discussed the effects of publicity in criminal trials and
established the duties of trial courts in guaranteeing the accused's right to a fair trial. This
series of decisions culminated in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), where the
Court concluded that, "[g]iven the pervasiveness of modem communications ... trial
courts must take strong measures" to protect the judicial process from prejudicial outside
interferences. Id. at 362.
2 In United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983), for example, the Court
held that "given the myriad safeguards provided to assure a fair trial, and taking into
account the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing
as an error-free, perfect trial, and.., the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial."
See also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 445 (1986); McDonough Power Equip.,
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604,
619 (1953); United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 378 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
947 (1978).
2 In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965), the Court stated: "While maximum
freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this important function in a democratic
society its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in
the judicial process."
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To balance all of the interests at stake, courts sometimes issue orders
banning publication of pretrial information. Although the First Amendment does not specifically refer to orders of this type, it has been
interpreted to protect the press from them.2 2 In fact, such "prior restraints" are considered "the most serious and least tolerable infringement
on First Amendment rights."23 Therefore, when an order banning
publication is requested, courts must determine whether such an order
would constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication. In
Nebraska Press Ass'n v Stuart, the United States Supreme Court
reiterated that such orders are presumptively unconstitutional prior
restraints on the press.2 4 However, in an attempt to solve the conflict 5
between the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the First Amendment freedom of the press, the Court stated that orders banning publication could be constitutionally valid under very limited circumstances.2 6
Recently, the American Bar Association ("ABA") amended its Standards
for Criminal Justice to conform to this decision.27

22

See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near, the Court discussed the

debate regarding the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution and concluded:
"[I]t has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose
of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Id. at 713. For the
modem debate on the intent of the Framers, see infra notes 39-45 and accompanying
text.
' Nebraska Press Ass'nv. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). In NebraskaPress,the
Court held that the petitioner of such an order has to satisfy a very high burden of proof
because prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional. Id. at 570. Speech about a
judicial proceeding is "protected" under the First Amendment because it involves matters
of public concern and matters related to the government and the way it fumctions. Id. at
559-60.
24
Id.at 558.
25 It has been argued that the conflict between the First Amendment freedom of the
press and the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant is only "apparent" because the
Constitution grants rights to the press and the defendant to be claimed against the state,
not against each other. For a good discussion of this proposition, see Hans Linde, Fair
Trialsand PressFreedom- Two Rights Againstthe State, 13 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 211,
217 (1977). The fact is, however, that there is a conflict. On the one hand, the state must
guarantee that the defendant gets a fair trial, while at the same time it must not abridge
the freedom of the press. Both the press and the defendant have constitutional rights that
should be protected by the state, which can lead to the type of "conflict" discussed in this
article.
26 A prior restraint on publication would be valid only with proof of the following:
(1) the nature and extent of the publicity would impair the defendant's right to a fair trial;
(2) there are no alternative measures that could mitigate the effects of the publicity; and
(3) the
restraint would be effective. NebraskaPress, 427 U.S. at 562.
27

See STANDARDS

(THIRD) FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Standard 8-3.1 (American Bar

1995-961

PRIoR RESTRAINTS ON THE MEDIA

The standard created by the Supreme Court and recently adopted by
the ABA has proven to be inoperable and confusing, and its use threatens
the First Amendment protection of freedom of the press. To provide a
consistent interpretation and application of the rights protected by the
First Amendment, the premise of the decision in NebraskaPress must be
re-examined and an absolute rule protecting the press from prior restraints
must be adopted.
This Article begins by exploring prior restraint and freedom of the press
jurisprudence.28 Next, the Article discusses the problems which arise in an
attempt to balance the First Amendment freedom of the press with the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial.29 The American Bar Association has
established standards to deal with issues of free press and fair trial, but
throughout the years these standards have been revised several times,
paralleling the inability of the courts to establish a clear standard."0 Particularly, Nebraska Press Ass'n v Stuart" set the course for needless litigation
and injury to the First Amendment due to its failure to adopt an absolute
rule. 2 Although Nebraska Press concluded that restraining orders could be
justified in some instances, the standard is almost impossible to meet.33
Additionally, the Nebraska Press standard leads to courts becoming
prepublication censors.3 4 Even temporary bans on publication are unconstitutional prior restraints, since they have an immediate suppression effect on the
dissemination of ideas.3" The judiciary's contempt power and the effect of
the collateral bar rule also tend to chill freedom of the press and amount to
unjustified court censorship. 6 The Article then discusses studies that have
shown that pretrial publicity does not pose an insurmountable threat to the
defendant's rights to a fair trial. In fact, most prejudice can be effectively
diminished in alternative ways, thus obviating the need for the remedy of
prior restraint. 37 The Article concludes, therefore, that to eliminate groundless litigation and prevent the courts from becoming prepublication censors,
the courts should adopt an absolute rule against the use of prior restraints.3"
Ass'n 1991) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS 3D].
28 See infra notes 39-66 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 67-136 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
3, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

See infra notes
3 See infra notes
34 See infra notes
31 See infra notes
36See infra notes
37 See infra notes
38See infra notes
32

157-60 and accompanying text.
161-78 and accompanying text.
179-97 and accompanying text.
198-216 and accompanying text.
217-56 and accompanying text.
257-75 and accompanying text.
276-91 and accompanying text.
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I. PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court has defined a prior restraint as any prohibition on

speech issued in advance of publication.39 Originally, the phrase "prior
restraint" was used to describe an administrative licensing system which
allowed the state to determine what could be published in advance.

Through the analysis of the Supreme Court, however, the doctrine of
prior restraints has been extended to statutes that allow suppression of
speech, to injunctions issued by courts after full hearings and to

temporary restraining orders.40 The doctrine is not related to the substance of the speech but to the effect that the government's method of
regulation will have on speech.4 '
Because at the time of the enactment of the First Amendment in 1791
the English prior restraint licensing system had been abandoned for
almost one hundred years,42 it has been questioned whether the Framers
intended the Amendment to protect against prior restraints.43 However,
39
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 721 (1931). However, the Court made it clear
that the protection against prior restraints is not absolute. Id. at 716. According to the

prior restraint doctrine, "the government may not restrain a particular expressionprior to
its dissemination even though the same expression could be constitutionally subjected to
punishment after dissemination." MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 127 (1984).
40 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (banning
publication of information implicating the accused in a criminal trial); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (finding a statute that allowed suppression of a newspaper after a
hearing in court unconstitutional).
"' In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), the
court suggestedthat prior restraints are defined by four elements: (1) a governmental order
that restrains specified expression; (2) the order must be obeyed until reversed; (3) the
violation of the order may be punished as contempt; and (4) the proceedings conducted
for its violation do not include all the safeguards of a criminal trial, including the fact
that the violator cannot argue the constitutionality of the order as a defense to its
violation.
42 The English Licensing Act of 1662 was repealed in 1694. See John C. Jeffries, Jr.,

Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 412 (1983) (discussing the English
Licensing Act); see also William Medlen, Inside Edition: Out of a PriorRestraintand

Above the Law?, 13 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 164, 165 (1992). For a detailed history of the
development of the doctrine before the adoption of the First Amendment, see Paul L.
Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context ofHistoricalDevelopments,66 MINN. L. REV.

95, 98-105 (1981).
4' Rodney Smolla has explained the difficulty of determining the "original intent"
of the Framers of the First Amendment:
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Discerning the original meaning of the First Amendment is a frustrating
exercise. First there were many persons involved in the process of drafting,
approving, and ratifying the Bill of Rights, and they came from many different
perspectives and acted out of many different motivations. So one must either
reduce their differences to a common denominator, which inevitably will be a
principle so general as to be of little concrete guidance for deciding future
conflicts, or instead choose which of the many "framers" to emphasize in
determining their collective intent. Second, the Bill of Rights was ratified at a
time of great intellectual ferment, in which the views of many of the framers,
including such key figures as James Madison, were in rapid flux. And so one
must choose what specific time, within this period of robust philosophical
transition, to focus upon. Finally, the framers did not always act as they spoke.
Some of them might give ringing endorsements to the ideals of free speech in
one breath, and instigate some act of heavy-handed censorship in the next.
SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 1-2 to 1-3.
It is clear that the dominant freedom of speech doctrine at the time was based on the
views of English commentator William Blackstone. To Blackstone, freedom of the press
was necessary for the maintenance of a free state, but it consisted only of a prohibition
of prior restraints on publications, and not in immunity from the ramifications of
publishing. He wrote:
The Liberty of the press is indeed essential to ensure the nature of a free state,
but it consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every free man has
an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public, but if
he published what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the
consequence of his own temerity.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152 (1779). See Belinda J. Scrimenti, A
Journalist'sView ofThe Progressive Case: A Look at the Press.PriorRestraint,and the
FirstAmendmentfrom the PentagonPapersto the Future,41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1176
(1980). However, it is not so clear whether the protection of the First Amendment was
meant to be broader than this Blackstonian view. As Rodney Smolla has explained: "The
key historical question is whether the [F]ramers saw themselves as adopting Blackstone
and the English Common Law understanding of freedom of speech, or rebelling against
it." SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 1-10.
Different interpretations of the historical evidence have therefore led to different
conclusions. Leonard Levy, for example, has argued that the First Amendment was
intended to prevent prior restraints. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS 266-69, 272-74, 281, 348-49 (1985). Zechariah Chafee and David A. Anderson,
in contrast, have argued that the First Amendment had to be intended to protect much
broader freedoms, in part because it could not have been intended to prohibit a practice
that had already been abandoned. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH INTHE UNITED
STATES (1941); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 455 (1983). Smolla has concluded that at the time the First Amendment was ratified,
thinking on freedom of the press was evolving from theories of Blackstonian minimal
protection to procedural protections and to more sophisticated and expansive interpretations. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH INAN OPEN SOCIETY 33 (1993). Smolla also
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the Supreme Court has consistently concluded that the Amendment was
enacted at least to protect against prior restraints." It has also consistently held that prior restraints are the most dangerous infringement on
freedom of the press because their effect is to totally suppress speech and
because the press is unable to challenge the constitutionalityof the order
by disobeying it.45

states that there is a high probability that many of those involved in the adoption of the
Amendment did not focus on the meaning of the principles it embodies. Id. at 36. His
conclusion on the issue is simple: "One can keep going round and round on the original
meaning of the First Amendment, but no clear, consistent vision of what the [F]ramers
meant by freedom of speech will ever emerge." Id. at 38.
4 The Supreme Court's early interpretations of the First Amendment appear to be
based on Blackstone's theory of freedom of speech. See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (stating that the First Amendment was enacted to embody certain
guaranties "which we had inherited form our English ancestors"); see also Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that the
main purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent previous restraints upon publication
such as had been practiced by other governments, but not subsequent punishment for
expressions contrary to the public welfare. This view soon evolved. In Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919), Justice Holmes questioned his earlier statements and
concluded: "It may well be that the prohibition of laws abridging freedom of speech is
not confined to previous restraints."
More recent cases support this view, and a rejection of the view that the First
Amendment was enacted only to protect against prior restraints. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 (1979) ("First Amendment protection reaches
beyond prior restraints."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 (1942)
("The protection of the First Amendment ... is not limited to the Blackstonian idea that
freedom of the press means only freedom from restraint prior to publication."); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941) (stating that the Framers of the First Amendment
"intended to give to liberty of the press... the broadest scope that could be countenanced
in an orderly society"); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246 (1936)
(stating that if the Framers meant to prohibit only prior restraints, the First Amendment
would be redundant as a mere codification of then-existing common law concepts).
In Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), the Court stated for the first
time that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech was enacted at leastto
protect against prior restraints: "[T]he main purpose of [the First Amendment] is 'to
prevent all such previous restraintsupon publications as had been practiced by other
governments."' Id. (citations omitted). In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931),
the Court also concluded: "[L]iberty of the press... has meant, principally although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship." See alsoNebraskaPress,
427 U.S. at 539; New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
41 After reviewing the decisions in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971), New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), andNear v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Nebraska
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The Supreme Court first discussed the doctrine of prior restraints in
detail in its 1931 decision in Near v Minnesota.46 In Near, the Court
declared unconstitutional a nuisance statute designed to eliminate
scandalous or defamatory publications.47 Under the statute, a court had
the power to order editors to stop publishing if it was convinced that the
publication was detrimental to public morals and general welfare.4 8 If

the editors of such a publication wanted to publish again after the order
was issued, they had to get permission from the court. 49 After the ninth
issue of the Saturday Press, "a vituperative scandal sheet if there ever
was one," 50 a district attomey requested an injunction based on an

evaluation of the publication's anti-Semitic and racist remarks. The Court
granted a permanent injunction and ordered the editors to stop publishing.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the decision, but the
United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the statute
amounted to a prior restraint because the effect of a court order under the
statute was the suppression of the publication of information.5 The
Court stated that since the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to
protect against the imposition of prior restraints, the statute was unconstitutional.52 Chief Justice Hughes concluded that even if the published

Press Court stated:

The thread running through all these cases is that prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights. A criminal penalty or a judgment in a defamation case is
subject to the whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of
the judgment until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted.... A
prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible
sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
publication "chills" speech, prior restraint "freezes" it at least for the time.
NebraskaPress,427 U.S. at 559 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 61 (1975)). Bickel has written: "Prior restraints fall on speech with a brutality
and a finality all their own. Even if they are ultimately lifted they cause irremediable loss
- a loss in the immediacy, the impact, of speech.... A prior restraint, therefore, stops
more speech more effectively. A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes." BICKEL,
supra, at 61. See also Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint,20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
46 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
47
1Id.at 723.
4
1d. at 709.
49
Id.at 712.
50Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory ofPriorRestraint:The CentralLinkage,66 MINN.
L. REV. 11, 15-16 (1981).
st
Near,283 U.S. at 711.
2
1d.
I at 713, 722-23.
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information was false and defamatory, the aggrieved parties could have
other remedies, such as a defamation action against the press. 3
In reaching its conclusions, however, the Near Court gave the concept
of prior restraint a much broader meaning than it had been afforded
before. The Minnesota law did not create a licensing system. The
decision to enjoin a publication was made by a court after a hearing and
not by an administrative licenser or censor prior to publication. Yet,
according to the Court, any governmental action with the effect of
suppression of speech before publication, whatever its character, would
be considered a prior restraint. 4 The Court declared clearly for the first
time that the government may not abridge freedom of speech prior to
publication because, by suppressing or delaying it, the government
deprives speech of its effectiveness.55
The Court stated, however, that the protection against prior restraints
was not absolute and suggested three exceptions: cases of obscene
material, cases of fighting words and incitement to violence or to
overthrow the government, and cases of national security during war
(where the information to be published could endanger troops or the
success of a mission). 6 Unfortunately, the Court offered no explanation
for these exceptions, nor why they should be considered to be outside the
theory of prior restraints.57
On the one hand, Near recognized for the first time that prior
restraints on the press are presumptively unconstitutional and that the
party seeking an injunction to prevent publication has a heavy burden to
overcome. On the other hand, it sent the message that prior restraints
could be acceptable under certain circumstances. Near thus opened the
53

Id. at 718-19.
Id. at 713-14. This extension of the doctrine has been criticized by some
commentators. See, e.g., William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of FirstAmendment
Process: Injunctions of Speech. Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior
Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 282 (1982) (concluding that because
injunctions are the product ofjudicial process, they should not be considered to be in the
same category as licensing and prepublication censorship and should be preferred to
subsequentpunishment). For a response to this argument, see Howard 0. Hunter, Toward
a Better Understandingof the PriorRestraintDoctrine:A Reply to ProfessorMayton,67
54

CORNELL L. REv. 283 (1982).
51 Near, 283 U.S. at 722.
56

Id. at 716.
In listing the exceptions, Chief JusticeHughes cited and discussedOliver Wendell
Holmes' decision in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), which was not a
decision about prior restraints, but about subsequent punishment. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
See Tim A. Pilgrim, Dictum Recasts the FirstAmendment: A RevisionistExaminationof
Near v. Minnesota, COMM. & LAW June 1991, at 43, 51-52.
17
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door for courts to allow restraints on the press in the future, but it did not
explain the standards that should be applied in those cases.
The underlying ambiguity of the standards applicable to prior restraint
cases became apparent in New York imes Co. v United States (The
Pentagon Papers Case),5" where the badly fractured Court published ten
separate opinions. 9 In The Pentagon Papers Case, the Court confronted
the government's attempt to enjoin the publication of articles based on a
secret study of involvement by the United States in the Vietnam War,
which had been leaked to the press.6 0 In a very short per curiam
opinion, the Court merely reiterated that any order to prohibit publication
has a heavy presumption against constitutional validity because its effect
is that of a prior restraint, and that the party seeking the prior restraint
has a heavy burden to show the justification of such a remedy.6 Even
though the Court was dealing for the first time with the national security

exception mentioned in Near, it did not explain the meaning of the
burden needed to satisfy this analysis.

Each Justice filed an opinion in the case.62 Only two of them argued
that the First Amendment does not admit any exceptions.63 All others

8403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
3 There was a per curiam opinion, plus a separate opinion from each Justice.

60 On June 13, 1971, The New York Times published a section of the study. The

President asked The Times to stop publication, but it went ahead and published two more
sections. Two days later, the government filed a petition for a temporary restraining order
in federal district court, arguing that further publication would threaten national security.
This petition was denied by the district court on June 19, 1971. United States v. New
York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). However, the case was
remanded for further proceedings by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on June 23,
1971. Meanwhile, on June 18, The WashingtonPost began publishing sections of the
secret report. The government again filed a petition for an injunction in federal district
court. The court denied this petition, but again a court of appeals remanded for further
hearings. Upon these further hearings, the district court denied the petition for an
injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed. Both cases were then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted expedited review. Eighteen days from the date of
the first publication, the Supreme Court rendered its decision. For a detailed discussion
of all of the facts surrounding The PentagonPapers Case, see David Rudenstine, The
Pentagon Papers Case: RecoveringItsMeaningTwenty Years Later, 12 CARDOZo L. REV.

1869 (1991).
61

New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.

62

See Scrimenti, supranote 43, at 1179-81 (discussing the spectrum of opinions in

New York Times Co.).

New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 715 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas,
J., concurring). Justices Black and Douglas frequently expressed absolutist views on the
First Amendment. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 156
(1973) ("The ban of 'no' law that abridges freedom of the press is in my view total and
63
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accepted the idea that there was a national security exception to the prior
restraint doctrine. Chief Justice Burger went even further and stated that
there could be other exceptions not yet recognized by the courts.'
Given these differences in opinion, Justice Blackmun called for the

creation of clear standards to be used in prior restraint cases.65
Unfortunately, the Court did not create any standards. It is also nearly
impossible to get an accurate idea of what standards would be acceptable

to a majority of the Justices from the ten different opinions. The Court
did not conclude that the state cannot impose a prior restraint on the press
for national security reasons. It only stated that, in The Pentagon Papers
Case, the government did not meet the burden of proof required to
support its claim. The Court did not provide any discussion on the
original restraining order imposed on the press and did not discuss the
evidence used by the government to support its claim. In essence, the
Court failed to provide any guidelines for future litigants as to what
would constitute sufficient evidence to comply with the burden of proof
needed to overcome the presumption of invalidity that accompanies a
petition for an order banning publication of protected information by the
press. Therefore, the Court left the door open for future attempts by the
government to ban dissemination of information prior to publication.
Ironically, even though the decision was a victory for the press at the

time, it led to a dangerous expansion of the prior restraint doctrine.66
complete.") (Douglas, J.,concurring); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274-75
(1952) ("I do not agree that the Constitution leaves freedom of petition, assembly, speech,
press or worship at the mercy of a case by case, day by day majority of this Court....
I think the First Amendment... absolutelyforbids [laws that prohibit or punish speech]
without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases.'") (Black, J.,dissenting); see also Belinda J.
Scrimenti, supranote43, at 1179-80 (describing JusticesBlack's and Douglas' absolutist
views on First Amendment protections).
6 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 749 (Burger, J., dissenting).
65 Justice Blackmun stated: "What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly
developed standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow right
of the government to prevent. Such standards are not yet developed." Id. at 761
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66 Eight years after The PentagonPapersCase, the United States government again
attempted to get an order banning publication of information on national security grounds.
In United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), dismissed
withoutopinion,610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979), the government claimed that an article The
Progressivewasgoing to publish on how to build a hydrogen bomb would constitute a
threat to national security. The district court agreed and issued an injunction against
publication, but the case was abandoned later because another publication printed the
article. In a series of other cases, courts have legitimized the government's efforts to force
employees to surrender their rights to publish information related to classified national
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II. PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND FAIR TRIALS
Even though the problem of conflicts between the justice system and
media reporting can be traced back as far as 1807,67 it was not until the
security information. In United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert.denied,
409 U.S. 1063 (1972), for example, the court allowed an injunction banning publication
of a book that allegedly contained confidential information about the CIA, based on its
interpretation of an employment contract agreement between the author and the CIA. The
court held that the First Amendment precluded restraints with respect to unclassified
information, but not with respect to classified information touching on national defense.

Id.at 1316-17. In McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court
held that restrictions on a government employee's speech rights must further a substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of speech, and that such restrictions
must be narrowly drawn. See also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)
(interpreting the government's claim as a breach of contract issue and not a prior restraint
question); Kenneth J. Pierce, PublicCryptography,Arms Export Controls, and the First

Amendment:A NeedforLegislation.17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 198 (1984) (discussing
the national security exception for prior restraints in the context of encryption technology).
See generallyMichael A. Ferruggia, Note, Balancing the Interestsof NationalSecurity
andFreeSpeech: A ProposedModificationofthe EnglishApproach SuitableforAdoption
in the U.S., 4 TOURo J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1993) (discussing the national security

rationale for prior restraints).
67 In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Smart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Court stated that the
problems presented by excessive media coverage of criminal trials "are almost as old as
the Republic," id. at 547, and concluded that it would be "inconceivable that the authors
of the Constitution were unaware of the potential conflicts between the right to an
unbiasedjury and the guarantee of freedom of the press."Id. The Court cited a letter from
Thomas Jefferson, written in 1786, where he concluded that even though it is disturbing
that a person could be "arraigned in a newspaper," it was an evil for which there is no
remedy because liberty depends on freedom of the press. Id. at 548.
In 1807, Aaron Burr complained that it would be difficult to find an impartial jury
to serve in his treason trial because of the publicity surrounding the charges. Since Burr
was acquitted, there was no occasion for appellate review of the problem of prejudicial
pretrial publicity. Id. See Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View ofMedia - Judiciary
Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the FairTrial - Free Press
Issue, 18 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 3 (1989); see also J. EDWARD GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME:
COURTS & PRESS IN CONFLICT 70-72 (1983).

Another famous example appeared in 1935, when almost one thousand reporters and
photographers rallied to a small town in New Jersey to cover the trial of Bruno
Hauptmann, who was accused of the kidnap-murder of Charles Lindbergh's son. During
this trial, the media disrupted the proceedings by taking pictures and movies in violation
of a court order. One newspaper conducted an informal poll and published that the
defendant had been found guilty by the public. Sheldon Portman, The Defense ofFair
Trialfrom Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: BenignNeglect to AffirmativeAction
and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 396-97 (1977). The trial was described as "perhaps

the most spectacular and depressing example of improper publicity and professional
misconduct ever presented to the people of the United States in a criminal trial." Oscar
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late 1950s that the Supreme Court began to make it clear that excessive
media reporting could violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
Between 1959 and 1966, the Supreme Court for the first time reversed
several criminal convictions because they had been reached under
circumstances heavily influenced by media coverage.6" In Marshall v
United States, for example, the Court reversed a conviction because seven
of the twelve jurors were exposed to news accounts of evidence that was
not admitted at trial.6 9 The Court concluded that "prejudice to the
defendant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the
jury through news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's
evidence."7 '
Two years later, in Irvin v. Dowd,7 the Court reversed a murder
conviction because, between the arrest and the trial for six murders in a
small rural community,7 2 ninety-five percent of the homes in the trial
court's county had access to numerous newspaper articles and editorials
against the defendant.7" The press reported that the defendant had
confessed to the six murders and described him as "remorseless and
without conscience."'" It also commented on his juvenile criminal
convictions and published a story about his court martial during the
war.7" Ninety percent of the jurors questioned in voir dire had formed
an opinion as to the defendant's guilt.76 Eight of the twelve actual jurors
had stated in voir dire that they thought the defendant was guilty.77
Given these facts, although the jurors indicated that they could render an
impartial verdict, the Court found a "pattern of deep and bitter preju-

Hallam, Some ObjectLessons on Publicityin CriminalTrials, 24 MINN. L. REV. 453, 454
(1940). See ZELEZNY, supra note 5, at 244 (discussing the media frenzy surrounding the
trial). It was in response to this trial that the ABA created the first committee to
recommend ways to deal with the problem of high publicity during trials. Portman, supra,
at 397.
6 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961);
Marshall v.United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (reversing a conviction because of the

effects
of trial publicity for the first time).
69
Marshall,360 U.S. at 313.

70 Id. at 312-13.

7'366 U.S. 717 (1961).
72 The community had approximately 30,000 inhabitants. Id. at 719.
73
1d. at 725.
74Id. at 720.
75
Id. at 725.
76
Id. at 727.
77Id.
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dice" created by extensive media coverage and reversed the lower
court.7 8
Similarly, in Rideau v Louisiana,the Court reversed the defendant's
conviction because the trial court had denied a change of venue after a
television station had broadcast a filmed confession three times, reaching
a combined audience estimated at 106,000 viewers in a community of
approximately 150,000 people.79 The Court held that refusal of the
request for a change of venue was a denial of due process because the
televised confession "in a very real sense was Rideau's trial,"80 and that
any "subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively
exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality."'"
Finally, in 1965, the Supreme Court reversed yet another conviction
because of the effect of pretrial publicity. In Estes v. Texas, the Court
held that the defendant had been deprived of due process of law after a
pretrial hearing was televised live and later rebroadcast to approximately
100,000 viewers. 8 2 In addition, the court proceedings were disrupted by
of reporters, photographers, cameramen and their equipthe presence
83
ment.
Through this line of cases, the Supreme Court reacted to the
particular circumstances of each situation and attempted to provide a
remedy for them. However, it did not really explain or give guidance to
trial courts on how to solve the issues related to prejudicial publicity in
the future. It was not until 1966, in Sheppard v. Maxwell,8" that the
Supreme Court provided guidelines on how to balance the interests of the
press and the rights of a criminal defendant. In Sheppard, the Court
reversed a conviction for murder, holding that publicity surrounding the
trial had deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial.85 Even before
the defendant was arrested, the media published countless stories about
him which accentuated his alleged failure to cooperate with the investigation and called strongly for his arrest.8 6 Many articles and editorials
78

Id. at 725.

79373 U.S. 723, 724 (1963).
80

Id. at 726.
81Id.
82 381 U.S. 532, 550-52 (1965).
83

id.

384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Id. at 335.
86
Id. at 338-39. After an article demanded to know why there had been no public
14
8

inquest, a three day inquest took place and Sheppard's questioning was covered by
television and radio. Id. at 339. Apparently another article influenced the decisionto arrest
Sheppard, since he was arrested hours after the headline "Why isn't Sam Sheppard in
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insinuated that Sheppard was guilty and discussed incriminating evidence
that was never introduced at trial." During the trial itself, the constant
movement of reporters in the courtroom made it difficult for witnesses to
be heard.8" Because of the defendant's proximity to reporters in the
courtroom, it was almost impossible for him to speak privately with his
- attorney during the proceedings.89 Despite these circumstances, the trial
judge did not take steps to limit the effects of the publicity and the
behavior of the press during the trial. The judge did not grant a continuance, change the venue of the trial, sequester the jury, insulate the jurors
from reporters, or prevent reporters from disrupting the proceedings.9"
In criticizing the trial court for allowing a "carnival atmosphere 91
in the courtroom and for falling to control the flow of publicity, the
Supreme Court ordered lower courts to take an affirmative role in
protecting the rights of defendants from undue interference by the press:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial
news comment on pending trials has become increasinglyprevalent. Due
process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free
from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modem communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds
of jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the accused.9"
These decisions sent a clear message to trial courts that even in the
absence of actual prejudice, pervasive pretrial publicity can affect a
defendant's right to a fair trial and that courts have a duty to protect the
defendant from the effects of prejudicial publicity. In Sheppard,the Court
enumerated some ways in which courts could make sure that publicity
does not affect the defendant's right to a fair trial. For example, courts

Jail?"87was published. Id. at 341.
Id. at 340-41.
88 Id. at 344. Twenty people were assigned to a special table for media representatives in the courtroom. The court also reserved four rows of seats behind the bar railing
for television and radio reporters and for representatives of out-of-town newspapers and
magazines. Id. The media used all available rooms in the building and a radio station was
allowed to broadcast from a room adjacent to the room where the jury rested and
deliberated. Id. at 343.
89
Id. at 344.
90Id. at

358-59.
I' at 358.
Id.
92 Id. at 362.
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could regulate the conduct of reporters in the courtroom,93 order a
change of venue,94 order a continuance of the trial," isolate the witnesses, 96 and control the release of information to the media by law
enforcement personnel and counsel. 97 However, the Court emphasized

that the remedy for prejudicial publicity is the implementation of
measures to prevent prejudice at its inception. The Court also urged lower
courts to take steps that would protect the judicial process from prejudicial outside interference.98
Although the Supreme Court in Sheppard did not suggest using direct
restraints on the media as a solution to the problems created by trial

publicity, courts soon began to issue such orders and injunctions as a
means of exercising the control encouraged in Sheppanr. 99 Restraints on
the media were considered an effective measure for protecting the judicial

process because they prevented prejudice at its inception.'0 0 Inevitably,
the media claimed that such orders were unconstitutional prior restraints,

and these arguments reached the Supreme Court.
In Nebraska Press Ass' v. Stuart, the Supreme Court incorporated
the prior restraint doctrine into the fair trial context.' 1 The Court
vacated an order restraining the press from publishing or broadcasting
9
1 Id.
94

at 358.
1d. at 363.

95 Id.
96

Id. at 359.

97

1Id. at

360-61. The Supreme Court has implied that a restraint on trial participants
is not the equivalent of a prior restraint on the media. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,
501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (attorney made pretrial statements to the press); see also Mark R.
Stabile, Note, FreePress - FairTrial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized

CriminalCase?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337, 342-43 (1990) (arguing for a consistent standard for
imposing gag orders); Rene L. Todd, Note, A PriorRestraintby Any Other Name: The
JudicialResponse to Media Challenges ofGag OrdersDirectedat Trial Participants,88

MICH. L. REv. 1171 (1990) (arguing that there should be no distinction between prior
restraints on the press and gag orders on trial participants).
9'Sheppard,384 U.S. at 363. The effectiveness of these remedial measures has been
questioned, however. See, e.g., Robert P. Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An
Opportunityfor Coexistence,29 STAN. L. REV. 561, 561-67 (1977).
99 In the comments to its Standards for Criminal Justice, the ABA refers to "the
widespread abuse of prior restraints in the early 1970s." ABA STANDARDS 3D, supranote
27, at 20. See also ZELEZNY, supra note 5, at 250.
'00 Indeed, in NebraskaPress Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,555 (1976), the Supreme
Court admitted that in issuing the restraining order "[t]he state trial judge ... acted
responsibly, out of a legitimate concern, in an effort to protect the defendant's right to a
fair trial." The Court was required, however, to determine whether the specific means
employed by the judge were foreclosed by the Constitution. Id. at 555-56.
'0o'd. at 539.
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accounts of admissions made by the accused, or of facts "strongly
implicative" of him, in a widely reported murder trial. Six members of
a family had been murdered in a small town of about 850 people. 2
The case immediately attracted media coverage locally and nationally,
which prompted the defendant and the prosecutor jointly to ask the court
for an order restricting the publication of information by the media
because of the threat to the defendant's right to a fair trial.'0 3 The
county court issued the order, and several press and broadcast associations, publishers, and individual reporters asked a district court to vacate
it.' O4 The district court revised the order and entered its own version,
holding that there was a "clear and present danger that pre-trial publicity
could impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial."'0 5 The order
of the district court included a ban on publication of the contents of a
note the defendant wrote on the night of the crime, the identity of the
victims of the alleged sexual assault, and certain aspects of the medical
testimony presented at the preliminary hearing. The order also prohibited
reporting the nature of the order itself. 6 The Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed, but attempted to balance the defendant's right to a fair trial and
the press' right to report pretrial events. The Nebraska Supreme Court
limited the order to the publication of facts pertaining to the defendant's
confession and admissions, and to other facts which were "strongly
implicative" of the defendant. 7 In a unanimous decision, the United
States Supreme Court reversed.'0 8
The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, recognized
that the press is important to the effective administration of justice
because the press guards against miscarriages of justice and subjects the
process to public scrutiny.0 9 The Court also emphasized that prior
restraints on publication are the most serious and "least tolerable
infringement" on First Amendment rights." 0 However, Burger recognized that the press had, at times, created such a biased atmosphere that
it had, in fact, affected a defendant's right to a fair trial and had forced
the court to order new trials. He reiterated that First Amendment rights

10 2 Id. at

542.

Id.

103

'04
Id. at 543.
5
"o
Id. (quoting the district judge).
'0°id.at 543-44.
0

0

7

Id. at 545.

' ' Id. at 570.
09
' Id. at 560 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
"Ild. at 559.
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are not absolute and, although the barriers against prior restraints remain
high, courts need to balance the defendant's right to a fair trial with the
First Amendment rights of the press on a case-by-case basis."'
Burger explained that because prior restraints carry a heavy presumption against constitutional validity, the burden of proof rests on the
petitioner to show that the order was needed to protect the rights of the
defendant." 2 In addition, he emphasized that the burden of proof
required to justify a prior restraint cannot be based on mere allegations,
nor on speculation." 3 Prior restraints are valid when the probability that
pretrial publicity will jeopardize a fair trial is demonstrated with the
"required degree of certainty."" 4 To meet this burden, a party seeking
an injunction must show that the publicity generated in the absence of an
injunction would be so prejudicial that the defendant could not possibly
get a fair trial." 5 The petitioner must also show that there are no
alternative measures which could mitigate the effect of the publicity and
that the injunction would be effective in guaranteeing a fair trial." 6
Only by meeting all three aspects of this test would a prior restraint on
the press withstand an attack under the First Amendment. As to the
alternative methods of protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial, the
Court reviewed its decisions in some of the fair trial cases and supported
using change of venue, sequestration of the jury, voir dire, and continu7
ances."
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Court concluded
that the order imposed on the press was unconstitutional because the
defendant did not meet the required burden of proof to defeat the
presumption against the validity of the order."8 First, the Court noted
that even in a rural community of only 850 people, the conclusion that

"1 Id. at 570. He was careful to conclude, therefore, that pretrial publicity did not lead
automatically to unfairness, and that the courts could not prohibit the press from reporting
news 2about the criminal justice system so easily. Id. at 565.
1 Id. at 558 (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
418-20

(1971)).
"3 Id. at 563, 569.
"4 Id. at 569. Unfortunately, this phrase does not provide a clear guideline because
the Court has never really explained what standard is needed to overcome the presumption. It did not explain it in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), nor in New York
Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See supra
notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
15 NebraskaPress,427 U.S. at 562.
116id.
" 7 Id. at

563-64.

1" Id. at 570.
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the publicity would make it impossible to find twelve unbiased jurors was
based on speculation." 9 The trial court had not shown that the publicity
"would so distort the views of potential jurors that [twelve] could not be
found."' 2 ° Only such a showing would have justified an injunction
against the press. Second, the petitioner failed to show that there were no
other alternatives available to protect the rights of the defendant.' 2 ' The
Court also determined that it was not clear that the order would have
successfully protected the rights of the defendant because the effect of the
publicity on the public was too difficult to predict. Finally, there was no
finding pertaining to the effect of the possible alternative measures on the
22
publicity.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall, advocated an absolute ban on prior restraints on
publication of information related to a criminal trial.12 He concluded
that, even though the right to a fair trial is one of the most sacred
rights, 2 a prior
restraint is an impermissible way to attempt to enforce
25
or protect it:
Settled case law concerningthe impropriety and constitutional invalidity
of prior restraints on the press compels the conclusion that there can be
no prohibition on the publication by the press of any information
pertaining to pending judicial proceedings or the operation of the
criminal justice system, no matter how shabby the means by which the
information is obtained. This does not imply, however any subordination of Sixth Amendment rights, for an accused's right to a fair trial
may be adequately assured
through methods that do not infringe First
26
1
values.
Amendment
Brennan criticized the majority opinion because it created a standard
that was almost impossible to meet. The majority concluded that
"' Id.at 569.
120
Id.
21

1 Id.
122
Id.

123Id.at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).

See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723,
726-27 (1963). Brennan emphasized that the right to a fair trial has been called "the most
fundamental of all freedoms" and that it is "a right essential to the preservation and
enjoyment of all other rights, providing a necessary means of safeguarding personal
liberties against government oppression." NebraskaPress,427 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
121 NebraskaPress,427 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
6
12
Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
324
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speculation about the effect of publicity would not be enough to satisfy
the burden needed to defeat the presumption against the prior restraint of
the press. 27 The majority also required that the petitioner show that the
publicity would make it impossible to find twelve jurors who could fulfill
their duties exclusively on the evidence presented in open court. 28 In
essence, to grant the order a court would have to be convinced that,
unless the press is restrained, the information would reach every possible
juror and that it would influence them in a way which could not be
remedied by jury instructions or other alternative measures. Yet, as the
majority admitted, it is almost impossible to determine the future effect
of publicity with certainty. 2 9 In fact, the effect of publicity cannot be
based on anything but speculation until the voir dire. Before the voir dire,
a judge cannot predict who will read the information or what effect it will
have on the readers. Even in cases where a court believes there is proof
of prejudice, it will be difficult to prove that there is not a less dramatic
alternative to protect the defendant's rights. 3
Brennan also warned of the possible consequences of not adopting an
absolute rule against prior restraints in this context:
Recognition of any judicial authority to impose prior restraints on the
basis of harm to the Sixth Amendment rights of particular defendants,
especially since the harm must remain speculative, will thus inevitably
interject judges at all levels into censorship roles that are simply
inappropriate and impermissible under the First Amendment.. . . The
incentives and dynamics of the system of prior restraints would
inevitably lead to overemployment of the technique. In order to
minimize pretrial publicity against his clients and pre-empt ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims, counsel for defendants might routinely
seek such restrictive orders. Prosecutors would often acquiesce in such
motions to avoid jeopardizing a conviction on appeal. And although
judges could readily reject many such claims as frivolous, there would
be a significant danger that judges would nevertheless be predisposed
to grant the motions .... 3 1
12 7 Id. at 569; id. at 604 (Brennan, J., concurring).
28

1

Id. at 569.

119 Id. It is very difficult to know what goes on in the mind of ajuror. See infranotes

257-75 and accompanying text, forashort discussionof research in the area of the effects
of publicity on jurors.
130 Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 600-02 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1Id. at 607-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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In sum, Brennan argued that the standard created by the Court could
lead to judges becoming prepublication censors, and to an increase in
litigation of prior restraint orders, which is precisely what the Court
wanted to avoid by creating the standard in the first place. In addition,
allowing courts to issue prior restraints could create the possibility of
"restraint proceedings collateral to every criminal case before the
courts," ' which would create "a significant financial drain on the
media involuntarily made parties to these proceedings.' ' 33 Eventually,
there would be a chilling effect because
media organizations would begin
34
to fear the risks of publication.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice White stated that it was
difficult to see how the standard created by the decision could ever be
met, but that he would wait for more cases before suggesting the adoption
of an absolute rule. 35 However, he admitted that if the result in case
after case were always the same, the Court should at some point
36
announce a more general rule and avoid the "interminable litigation."'
In the long run, the standard created by the Court could lead to the
abandonment of the use of prior restraints against the press in the fair
trial context because courts and litigants would realize that the test is
insurmountable. Ironically, it could also lead to the opposite result: an
increase in the use of injunctions against the press. By concluding that
there is a possibility that a case may meet the Nebraska Presstest, lower
courts could be persuaded, or even compelled, to grant temporary orders
while they determine if in fact the case before them does comply with the
standards. The consequences of this trend would be higher litigation
costs, both in terms of money and time, and temporary delays in the
publication of information, all of which would affect freedom of the
press.

III. THE ABA STANDARDS FOR CRUINAL JUSTICE
The debate about freedom of the press and fair trials received
increased national attention in 1963, after the assassination of Lee Harvey

132 Id. at 608 (Brennan, J., concurring).
33

id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
' In Brennan's words: "Indeed, small news organs on the margin of economic

1

viability might choose not to contest even blatantly unconstitutional restraints or to avoid
all crime coverage, with concomitant harm to the public's right to be informed of such
proceedings."
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring).
136 Id. (White, J., concurring).
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Oswald. The Report of the Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy (the Warren Report) criticized the news media for its role in
creating the publicity surrounding the allegations against Oswald.'37 In
fact, the Warren Commission expressed doubts that he could ever have
received a fair trial 3 and concluded: "The courtroom, not the newspaper or television screen, is the appropriate forum in our system for the
trial of a man accused of a crime."' 39 The report recommended the

creation of ethical standards for publicity to avoid interference with
criminal investigations and the rights of defendants. 4 '
In response to the recommendations of the Warren Commission and
the decision in Sheppard, the Judicial Conference of the United States
conducted a study and suggested two areas of concern for trial courts:
release of information to the press by attorneys and other trial participants, and the regulation of trial proceedings to protect jurors from
prejudicial influences.' Likewise, the ABA appointed a committee to
develop standards to regulate the criminal justice system. 42 During the
next four years the committee worked on the standards and presented a

37
"'
The report mentioned incriminating, but inadmissible, evidence published by the
press which could have affected the fairness of the trial, such as alleged statements by
Oswald's wife and his refusal to take a lie detector test. THE WARREN COMMISSION,

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN

F. KENNEDY 238 (1964). The report concluded that the press' curiosity should not be
satisfied at the expense of the accused's right to a trial by an impartial jury. Id. at 240.
3
' ' Id. at 239 ("The Commission agrees that Lee Harvey Oswald's opportunity for a
trial by 12 jurors free of preconception.. . would have been seriouslyjeopardized by the
premature disclosure and weighing of the evidence against him.").
39
' Id. at 240.
0
14 Id. at 27.
141 Report of the Committee on the Operationof the JurySystem on the "FreePressFair Trial" Issue of the JudicialConference of the United States, 45 F.R.D. 391, 401
(1968). Interestingly, the Committee did not recommend any direct curb or restraint on
publication by the press. Id.
142 The recommendations of this committee (usually referred to as the Reardon
Committee because it was chaired by Justice Paul Reardon of the Supreme Court of

Massachusetts) were published as ABA ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE

(1968). The recommendations were later adopted by the ABA as part of its
StandardsforCriminalJustice.Theserecommendations were based on the conclusion that
too much publicity about a trial can have a prejudicial effect on the fairness of the
process. The report has been criticized, however, because it did not support this finding
with any evidence from experiments, available at the time, about the effect of publicity
on jurors, nor did the committee attempt to conduct its own experiments. It based its
conclusions on the results of a questionnaire sent to attorneys and judges. See Benno C.
Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction
Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 446-47 (1977).
PRESS
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draft to the ABA House of Delegates in 1968.' 4 The standards included a chapter on the issue of "fair trial and free press," which included
sections on the conduct of attorneys and judges during trials, and on the
conduct of the judicial proceedings.'" Most of these standards were
based on the remedial recommendations of the Supreme Court in
Sheppani.'4 For example, the ABA recommended the exclusion of the
public from pretrial hearings, 14 hearings outside the presence of the
jury, continuances, changes of venue, control of the trial participants,
and the use of voir dire to minimize the effect of publicity on the
47
jurors. 1
141 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (American

Bar Ass'n 1978). Ten standards

were approved in 1968, three in 1970, two in 1971, one in 1972, and the rest in 1973.
STANDARDS (SECOND) FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE at xx, xxii (American Bar Ass'n 1980)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS 2D]. The introduction to the second edition of the
standards explains that they are intended to be a balanced attempt "to walk the fine
line between the protection of society and the protection of constitutional rights of
the accused individual." Id. at xxii. They are not model codes nor rules for jurisdictions.
[T]hey are guidelines and recommendations intended to help criminal justice
planners design a system, set goals and priorities to achieve it, and propose
procedures for adoption by the legislature, courts, and practitioners to operate
and keep it viable-all targeted toward achieving a criminal justice system that
is fair, balanced, and constitutionally responsive to the needs of today and the
future.
Id. at xx. Jurisdictions are free to adopt the standards and choose to implement them in
various ways, such as translating them into a code, rules of court or of practice, or by
encouraging judicial officers to look to the standards as authority in deciding appropriate
cases. Id. at xix.
These standards, however, are not the first attempt by the ABA to solve the problems
created by high publicity during trials. In 1936, in response to incidents during the
trial of Bruno Hauptmann, see supra note 67, the ABA formed a special committee to
study the effects of publicity on trials. The committee eventually proposed sixteen
recommendations, most of which were directed at limiting the amount of information
given by trial participants. Portman, supra note 67, at 397. However, the committee
did not make any recommendations regarding pretrial publicity generated by police or
non-attorney law enforcement officers. Id. at 398. The committee also failed to
emphasize the duty and powers of the trial courts to protect the rights of defendants.
Id.
144 See generally ABA STANDARDS 2D, supra note 143, ch. 8.
45
1 Id. at introduction to ch. 8, at 4-5.
46
' This exclusion would now be declared unconstitutional. In Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court (I), 478 U.S. 1 (1986), the Supreme Court decided that there
is a qualified
First Amendment right of access to pretrial proceedings.
147 ABA STANDARDS 2D, supra note 143, at 37-47.
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The first edition of the ABA Standards, published in 1968, did not
contain any sections on direct restraint of the media, but eight years later,
in response to NebraskaPress,the ABA Standing Committee on Criminal
Justice revised its standards and created Standard 8-3.1.148 However, the
standard was not in accord with the decision of the Supreme Court
149
because it precluded any and all prior restraint orders on the press.
Reasoning that the rule created by the Court in NebraskaPress was only
a step away from such an absolute ban,' the ABA decided that it
would be better to adopt a complete ban on prior restraints:
This standard [ABA Standard 8-3.1] categoricallyprohibits any judicial
measure that seeks to prevent the press from publishing information in
its possession relating to a criminal case. The circumstances under
which prior restraints could constitutionally be imposed are extremely
limited after the Supreme Court's decision in Nebraska Press [Ass'n]
v Stuart. Rather than invite courts to probe the limits of the First
Amendment in this area and thereby intensify conflicts with the press,
it is preferable to close the door entirely to the alternative of prior
restraints.' 5 '

In 1991, however, the ABA again revised its standards for criminal justice," 2 and abandoned this total ban for a "clear and present
danger test."'5 The ABA retreated from its prior position and decided to "conform more closely to the accepted legal standard"' 5 4 because a "nearly absolute" ban "is not an absolute ban."' 55 The
commentary to the new standard attempted to explain the change in
direction:
141
Id. at Standard
141Standard 8-3.1,

8-3.1, at 28 (1978).
"Prohibition on Direct Restraints on Media," states: "No rule of
court or judicial order shall be promulgated that prohibits representatives of the news
media from broadcasting or publishing any information in their possession relating to a
criminal case."
150 Id. at 29-31.
Id. at 29 (citation omitted).

ISI

152 ABA STANDARDS 3D,

supra note 27.
The new Standard 8-3.1 states: "Absent a clear and present danger to the fairness
of a trial or other compelling interest, no rule of court or judicial order should be
promulgated that prohibits representatives of the news media from broadcasting or
publishing
any information in their possession relating to a criminal case." Id. at 19.
4
153

11 .[d. at

20.

5
15
Id.at 20 n.3 (citation omitted).
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[T]he change must be understood as more formalistic than substantive. The standard is still intended to reflect a policy of nearabsolute prohibition of prior restraints on publishing....
Nebraska Press has aged better than expected as the leading guardian
of a free press. It has largely brought to a halt the widespread
abuse of prior restraints in the early 1970's....

The clear-and-

present danger safeguards to a free press therefore appear sufficient. "'
The change within the ABA illustrates the two possible consequences
discussed by Justice Brennan in NebraskaPress. The ABA initially suggested
a complete ban on the use of restraints on the press. Then the ABA changed
its position and recommended using the restraints, thus opening the door for
abuses. This, unfortunately, seems to be the tendency among the courts in
recent years.
IV PRIOR RESTRAINT AND FAmR
TRIALS SINCE NEBRASKA PRESS

Contrary to the conclusions of the ABA committee, NebraskaPress
has not aged gracefully. Since the case was decided, courts have been
struggling with the standard created by the Supreme Court to determine
the constitutionality of prior restraints on pretrial publicity. Although the
standard imposes a very difficult burden of proof on the petitioner, criminal defendants routinely request protective orders, gag orders on attorneys
15
and other trial participants,"' and restraining orders on the media.
The fact that Nebraska Press concluded that an injunction could be
justified in some cases has motivated many lower courts to issue
temporary restraining orders while they decide whether to issue permanent ones. The fact is, however, that in the twenty-five years following
Nebraska Press only two restraining orders have survived constitutional
156 Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
"s7 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court suggested the use of
orders controlling the flow of information from trial participants as a possible solution to
the problem created by pretrial publicity. Id. at 361-62. The Court has implied that this
type of order does not have the effect of a prior restraint. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
15' See infranote 160 for a list of cases in which courts have denied or vacated prior
restraint orders on the media in the fair trial context.
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attack.'59 In all other cases, the orders were either denied or reversed
on appeal. 6

I" See United States v. Noriega (In re Cable News Network), 917 F.2d 1543 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990),
discussedinfranotes 194-216 and accompanying text; KUTV v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 456
(Utah 1984). The KUTVcourt was the first court to allow a prior restraint order under the
NebraskaPresstest. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and later held a
hearing to determine whether it would issue a restraining order prohibiting the news media
from reporting on a criminal defendant's alleged connections to the Mafia. After deciding
that there were no alternatives to a restraining order, the court issued an order enjoining
the press until the jury had retired to deliberate. Id. at 461. The court decided that
sequestration was not a reasonable alternative because of the costs involved and the
amount of time the jurors would have to be confined. Id. at 460. Sequestering the jury and
constantly admonishing them through voir dire were also rejected as alternatives because
they could prejudice the jury against the defendant. Id.
In KUTV, however, the court actually misapplied the NebraskaPressstandard. With
no evidence to support it, the court speculated that repeated warnings and sequestration
would prejudice the jury against the defendant. Id. See also id. at 463 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that if a finding of prejudice to the defendant could be based on no
supporting evidence, similar findings could be made in every case involving prejudicial
publicity and sequestration would virtually never be appropriate). Stewart also took issue
with the majority's speculation that the publicity would taint all future jurors, when it was
not even clear that it had tainted the jurors who were excused in the first place. Id.
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The court also considered that the inconvenience caused by
sequestration outweighed the First Amendment rights of the press. Id. at 460. However,
considerations of cost and inconvenience are not valid reasons to enjoin the press under
the NebraskaPressanalysis. In the end, while affirming the trial court by asserting that
it had substantiated its finding on the NebraskaPressstandard, the court actually engaged
in the speculation Nebraska Press repudiated. In addition, the court added a fourth
element to the analysis under the Utah Constitution: the degree of public interest in
immediate access to the information to be published. Id. at 462. The court then concluded
that there was no significant public interest in the information in question. Id. In so doing,
of course, the court violated one of the most basic principles of First Amendment
jurisprudence - it invaded the decision-making process of the editors and became a
prepublication censor with the power to decide what information could and should be
published by the news media. Therefore, at least in this particular case, it was an
erroneous application of the NebraskaPressstandard which led to the wrong result.
On another occasion, a court interpreted an apparent prior restraint order to be a
constitutional restriction on time and place and did not discuss the prior restraint doctrine.
Tsokalas v. Purtill, 756 F. Supp. 89 (D. Conn. 1991) (ordering confiscation of a sketch
artist's drawing to prevent its publication).
" See, e.g., CBS v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912 (1994); In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d
47 (4th Cir. 1990); In re King World Productions, 898 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990); Hunt v.
NBC, 872 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1989); In reProvidence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir.
1986), modified820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert.dismissed,485 U.S. 693 (1988); CBS
v. U.S. District Court, 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1984); Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904
(9th Cir. 1978); Jones v. Turner, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
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The decisions in some of these cases clearly illustrate the inadequacy
of the Nebraska Press standard and the need to adopt a new absolute

rule. The first indication comes from the fact that it is almost impossible
to meet the standard. Secondly, it would be unconstitutional for a court
to require the press to produce the information prior to publication for the

court to decide whether the standard is met. Finally, it would also be
unconstitutional to stay the publication to take the time to decide whether
the standard is met. Given these problems, needless litigation and injury
to the First Amendment could be avoided by adopting an absolute rule.
V THE IMPOSSIBLE STANDARD
The Nebraska Press standard is almost impossible to meet because
rarely can a defendant convince a court that twelve impartial jurors
cannot be found, or that alternative measures will not eliminate the risks
created by the publicity. Indeed, in some of the most publicized murder

Menendez v. Fox Broadcasting Co., No. 94-233-9R, 1994 WL 525520 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
19, 1994); Corbitt v. NBC, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2037 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Fort Wayne
Journal Gazette v. Baker, 788 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Ind. 1992); Lambert v. Polk County,
723 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Iowa 1989); In re CBS, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1983),
appeal dismissedsub nom. United States v. McKenzie, 735 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1984);
KCST-TV Channel 39 v. Municipal Court, 246 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Lynch, 1989 WL 112545 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 1989); Gardner v. Bradenton Herald,
Inc., 413 So. 2d 10 (Fla.), cert denied,459 U.S. 865 (1982); Clear Channel Communications, Inc. v. Murray, 636 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Times Publishing Co.
v. Florida, 632 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Florida Publishing Co. v. Brooke,
576 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morphonios,
467 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Des Moines Register and Tribune Co. v.
Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1976); State ex rel. New Mexico Press Ass'n v.
Kaufman, 648 P.2d 300 (N.M. 1982); Wittek v. Cirigliano, 576 N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div.
1991); Hays v. Marano, 493 N.Y.S.2d 904 (App. Div. 1985); State ex rel. Chillicothe
Gazette, Inc. v. Ross County Court of Common Pleas, 442 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio 1982);
KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983).
For cases denying or vacating prior restraint orders related to the publication of
information about juvenile delinquency proceedings, see In re Lifetime Cable, 17 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1648 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Foretich v. Lifetime Cable, 498
U.S. 847 (1990); KGTV Channel 10 v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 181 (Ct. App.
1994); San Bernadino County Dep't of Public Social Services v. Superior Court, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 332 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Minor, 537 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Schmidt, 360 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Lee, 353 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); New Jersey ex rel.HN, 632
A.2d 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co. v.
Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252 (R.I. 1982); State ex rel. Register-Herald v. Canterbury, 449
S.E.2d 272 (W. Va. 1994).
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trials of recent years the courts either did not feel the need to issue
restraining orders or rejected the requested orders as unconstitutional prior
restraints. In Menendez v Fox Broadcasting Co., for example, a federal
district court refused to enjoin Fox Broadcasting from airing a docudrama
based on the lives and murder trial of Erik and Lyle Menendez while
they were awaiting retrial.16 The Menendez brothers were accused of
murdering their parents in a highly publicized case, and were the subjects
of the docudrama Honor Thy Fatherand Mother: The True Story of the
Menendez Murders.'6 2 Even with such a suggestive title,'63 the court
did not agree that the program would so severely taint the jury pool that
it would deny the defendants their right to a fair trial."6 The Menendez
court concluded that it did not have to stay publication to conclude that
none of the factors required by Nebraska Press was satisfied. The court
any
was confident that the trial judge could find jurors and could mitigate
65
effect of the publicity by using voir dire and jury instructions.1
In the notorious State v. Smith trial, in which William Kennedy
Smith, nephew of Senator Edward Kennedy, was tried for sexual battery,
the Florida Circuit Court did not even attempt to limit media coverage.' 66 The media frenzy that suirounded this trial led the defendant's
attorney to argue that it would be difficult for a jury to be impartial. The
court used some of the alternative measures suggested by the Supreme
Court in Nebraska Press to avoid a violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights, but it did not impose a prior restraint on the press.
The trial was conducted and televised all over the nation and the
defendant was found not guilty. This case raises doubts as to whether the
standard imposed by Nebraska Press is necessary. If the court in Smith
could be convinced that twelve impartial jurors could be found, it is
difficult to think of a case where this would not be possible.
Even in cases where the publicity included direct evidence of the
crimes for which the defendants were to be tried, courts have held the
proposed restraining orders unconstitutional. In CBS v United States

361 Menendez

v. Fox Broadcasting Co., No. 94-2339R, 1994 WL 525520, at *2 (C.D.

Cal. Apr.
19, 1994).
62
1 Id. at *1.
163The petitioners originally requested a restraining order postponing the broadcast
of the movie, but in the alternative they requested that the court order Fox to change the
title of the docudrama by eliminating the terms "murder" and "true story." Id.
164Id.
165 Id.

166

State v. Smith, 91-5482-CF-A02 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991). See Stephen, supra note 18,

at 1079-80 (discussing Smith and the media attention it generated).
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District Court, for example, the court held that an order to ban the
broadcast of surveillance tapes in the case against famous automobile
67
industrialist John DeLorean was an unconstitutional prior restraint.'
The FBI surveillance video tapes showed DeLorean committing the crime
for which he was being tried.16 1 Joined by the prosecution, DeLorean
filed a petition for an order to prohibit the broadcast, alleging that
showing him committing the crime for which he was being tried would
affect his right to a fair trial. 169 After considering the Nebraska Press
standard, the district court found that publication of the tapes would
affect the defendant's right to a fair trial and entered a temporary
restraining order delaying publication.1 7' The court reasoned that the
petitioner had met the burden of proof required under Nebraska Press
because:
(1) ... this case has generated "enormous, incessant and continually
increasing publicity" and, consequently, release of the government tapes
would have a "devastating effect"; (2) . . . "there is absolutely no
method... to remove the taint upon the minds ofpotential jurors"; and
(3) implicitly,... an order restraining CBS from broadcasting the tapes
would adequately guard against the threatened danger' 7'
The court of appeals reversed, rejecting the trial court's conclusions
that showing the tapes on television would affect the defendant's right to
a fair trial and that there were no other alternatives available.7 2 It held
that the restraining order had been based on speculation about the effect
of publicity. Given that the trial was held in the Los Angeles area, the
court concluded that it was not clear that the publicity would actually
prejudice the entire pool of available jurors, making it impossible to find
twelve impartial ones. 173 The court also found that there were several
alternative methods to avoid a violation of the defendant's rights, such as
a strong voir dire."7
167 729

F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1983).
161 1d. at 1179.
1691Id. at 1176.
17 0 Id. at 1178-79.
'' Id. (citing the district court opinion).
72
1 1d. at 1176, 1180.
11Id. at 1180-81. The court stated: "Thus it is not enough that publicity
might
prejudice one directly exposed to it. If it is to be restrained, the publicity must threaten
to prejudice the entire community so that twelve unbiased jurors can not be found." Id.
at 1180.
74
' Id. at 1181.
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Taken together, highly publicized cases where the courts did not issue
injunctions against the press and cases where the orders were declared
invalid lead to the conclusion that the NebraskaPress standard can never
be met, or that it is not really necessary to guarantee the rights of
criminal defendants to a fair trial. 7 In Nebraska Press itself, the Court
dealt with a highly publicized gruesome crime in a community of less
than a thousand people, yet the Court concluded it would be speculation
to say that twelve unbiased jurors could not be found.176 In CBS v.
United States District Court, the publicity involved video tapes of the
criminal activity for which the defendant was being tried.1" Arguably,
there cannot be a more prejudicial piece of publicity than a video tape of
the defendant committing the crime for which he or she will be tried.
Indeed, as the court stated in CBS, if the test is applied as explained by
the Supreme Court, "there may be no reason for courts ever to conclude

that traditional methods are inadequate and that the extraordinary remedy
of prohibiting expression is required." '78
VI.

ORDERS TO PRODUCE THE INFORMATION
FOR REVIEW BY THE COURT

In his opinion in Nebraska Press, Justice Brennan warned that the
standard created by the Court could lead to a shift in the burden of proof
and to courts becoming prepublication censors." 9 This, precisely, is the
second reason why the Nebraska Press standard has not aged gracefully.

175There are many other high publicity cases that could be used to substantiate this

argument. For example, the case of former Attorney General John Mitchell was heavily
publicized, and a private survey showed 84% of those who had heard of the case thought
Mr. Mitchell was guilty. Yet, he was eventually acquitted. See Gene S. Graham, From the
Press,in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 199, 202 (R. Simon ed., 1975), cited in CBS
v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1983). Apparently, even
in such a clearly biased atmosphere a prior restraint order was not needed to guarantee a
fair trial. Likewise, in 1990, broadcasters all over the United States showed a surveillance
tape of Marion Barry, then the mayor of Washington D.C., engaging in an illegal drug
transaction. Even though the tape of the transaction, the investigation, and the trial itself
received extensive media coverage, the court did not see the need to impose any restraints
on the press. See Paul Valentine, Analyst Calls Quality of Tape "Actually Pretty Good",
WASH. POST, July 2, 1990, at D7; Juan Williams, Barry's Victims, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville),
July 5, 1990, at 7A.
17 6
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976).
177 729 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1983).
.77 9 Id. at 1183.
1 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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History has proven that Brennan was right. In re CBS 180 exemplifies
the problem. In this criminal case, the defendants requested an order to
ban the broadcast of a segment on the program 60 Minutes, arguing that
the order was needed because the courts had already tried alternative
measures to avoid interference with their right to a fair trial. 8 ' The
venue had been changed once already and the trial had been continued
several times. In fact, at the time of the request for the order, the case
was two years old.'82 The venue for the trial had been changed to
Dallas and the 60 Minutes program was scheduled to be broadcast after
a nationally televised Dallas Cowboys football playoff game. 18 1 Given
that NebraskaPress suggested that there may be cases where a restraint
should be allowed, the court felt it needed to review the evidence to reach
a conclusion as to the constitutionality of the requested order. Therefore,
in an attempt to determine whether the Nebraska Press standard would
be met, the court ordered CBS to produce a copy of the program to check
its accuracy and to determine the possible effects of the publicity.84
CBS refused, and was held in criminal contempt.'
The criminal contempt order was vacated later and the court held that
the order to produce the video tape had been an invalid prior restraint
on the press.'86 The court had acted as a prepublication censor and
therefore interfered with the First Amendment rights of the press
because it subjected the broadcast to the court's permission.8 7 Moreover, the court did not have to review the tape since it had concluded
that there was only a "slight chance" that the broadcast would prevent
the impaneling of an impartial jury and that it was "very unlikely" that
it would issue a restraining order. The fact is that the trial court did
not have to inspect the video tape to be able to conclude that twelve
jurors probably could be found in a city of 3.6 million residents.'8 8

IS'

570 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1983), appeal dismissedsub nom. United States v.

McKenzie, 735 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1984).
"'
Id. at 579.
82
1

id.

183 Id.
1 4 Id. at

582.

"' Id. at 579. See infranotes 217-56 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the

chilling effect that the threat of contempt orders has on the press.
116In re CBS, 570 F. Supp. at 583.
187

Id. at 581-82.

188 Id. at 582-83. CBS offered an uncontroverted affidavit indicating that an average

of three million Dallas residents did not watch 60 Minutes.Id. In United States v. Noriega
(In re Cable News Network), 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom Cable
News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990), discussed infra notes 194-208 and
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Ironically, in trying to do what the Supreme Court has held that the
Constitution requires courts to do, the district court ended up violating the
Constitution.
Similarly, in Goldblum v. NBC, 9 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit vacated an order instructing NBC to produce a film so the
court could "view it for inaccuracies.""19 Evidently, the trial court
issued the order because it felt the need to review the evidence before
deciding whether the Nebraska Press standard had been met. 9' Yet, the

appeals court held it was an invalid prior restraint because it was issued
for the sole purpose of determining whether the court should prohibit
broadcast of the film. 92 The court concluded:
It is a fundamental principle of the [F]irst [A]mendment that the
press may not be required to justify or defend what it prints or says
until after the expression has taken place. The Government has been
prohibited from interfering with the editorial process by entering the
composing room to give directives as to the content of expression. The
district court proceedings here intervened in the editorial process....
A procedure thus aimed toward prepublication censorship is an inherent
threat to expression, one that chills speech. 93

Evidently, the need to determine whether the requested order can be
issued under the Nebraska Press standard can lead a court to violate the
Constitution. In Goldblum and In re CBS, the courts remedied this

accompanying text, the first case where a federal court allowed a prior restraint under the
NebraskaPress standard to survive, the trial was going to be held in a forum with a
population of over 3.1 million people. The jury pool probably had over one million
people. Eric M. Schweiker, United States v. Noriega: Conflicts Between the First
Amendment and the Rights to a FairTrial andPrivacy, 1993 U. CH. LEGAL F. 369, 375
(1993).
189 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978). In this case, the petitioner askedthe court to prohibit
NBC from broadcasting a film based on the events leading to his trial. He argued that the
film would show a false portrayal of him and would jeopardize his appeal, his chances
for parole, and his rights to a fair trial in a possible future criminal trial and in a current
civil trial. Id. at 905. The court ordered NBC to produce the film but NBC refused,
arguing that the order violated its First Amendment rights. The court then ordered the
imprisonment of NBC's attorney until NBC produced the film. Id. at 906.
90
Id. The "screening" would take place just 12 hours before the film's scheduled
broadcast.
191Id.
192 Id.

"'3Id. at 907 (citations omitted).
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violation. In United States v. Noriega"' they did not. In Noriega, CNN
planned to broadcast six recordings of telephone calls made by Panamanian General Manuel Noriega from his prison cell.' 95 Joined by the
prosecution, Noriega requested a restraining order. Reasoning that it
needed to review the evidence to decide whether to issue a restraining
order, the court ordered CNN to produce the recordings. 9 6 At the time
he requested the restraining order, Noriega had not overcome the burden

of proof required of parties seeking to impose a prior restraint on the
media. By ordering CNN to produce the tapes, the court shifted the bur-

den of proof to the media to show why the prior restraint should not be
issued. Once again, the court actually issued a temporary prior restraint
on publication to determine whether it would issue a permanent one.
The trial judges in Goldblum, In re CBS, and Noriega attempted to
apply the NebraskaPress standard. They tried to avoid speculating about

the character of the publicity at stake by getting access to it. Yet, the
orders they issued were unconstitutional because they shifted the burden
of proof onto the press to prove that the information would not affect the
defendant and banned publication of protected speech until it was cleared
by the court. In effect, they became prepublication censors. Following the
reasoning in Near and Nebraska Press, the judges should have realized
that their decisions were unconstitutional.'9 7 Once again, however, in
attempting to meet the Nebraska Press standard, the courts instead
violated the Constitution.
94
"'
United States v. Noriega (In re Cable News Network), 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.),

cert.denied sub. nom Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).
95
' Id. at 1545.
196United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Upon CNN's
insistence that the court look to the government for production of the tapes, the court
ordered the government to produce a log of the calls. The log showed several times more
than the amount of calls CNN was planning to broadcast. The judge told CNN he could
review the government tapes but this would prolong the time during which CNN could
not publish. Id. at 1035-36. The court held:
It seems fundamentally unfair to allow CNN to benefit from its refusal to
disclose the contents of the tapes to the court - that is, to allow CNN to argue
that no prior restraint should issue because no clear and immediate harm is
apparent when the only reason that no clear and immediate harm yet appears is
because CNN has so far prevented this court from reviewing the content of the
tapes in its possession.
Id. at 1035.
' In the case of Noriega,the judge also had CBS v. U.S. District Court, 729 F.2d
1174 (9th Cir. 1984), In re CBS, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1983), appeal
dismissed sub nom. United States v. McKenzie, 735 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1984), and
Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978), as authority.
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VII.

THE USE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS

The third reason for abandoning the NebraskaPress standard is that
in an honest attempt to decide whether to issue an injunction, courts are
issuing unconstitutional temporary restraining orders, suggesting they are
valid because they are only temporary.' 8 The fallacy of this analysis
lies in the fact that to be effective, a temporary order must prevent all
speech while the court determines whether or not the information should
be banned. The temporary order has an immediate suppression effect on
the dissemination of ideas and thus operates as a prior restraint.
This problem is best exemplified by United States v. Noriega'9 9
There, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted
Noriega's request to ban the broadcast by CNN of six recordings of
telephone calls made by Noriega from his prison cell.2"0 The issue for
the court was the same one found in all the fair trial-prior restraint cases:
the judge had a duty to protect the rights of the defendant and had to
apply the Nebraska Press standards to decide whether to issue a prior
restraint order. Given that Nebraska Press had held that there could be
a case where a prior restraint would be acceptable, the judge felt he

needed to examine the tapes to determine whether this was the rare case
in which a prior restraint could be constitutionally valid.20 ' Therefore,

"I See, e.g., United States v. Noriega (In re Cable News Network), 917 F.2d 1543
(Ilth Cir.), cert.deniedsub. nom Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990);
CBS v. U.S. District Court, 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1984); Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d
904 (9th Cir. 1978); In re CBS, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1983), appealdismissed
sub nom.United States v. McKenzie, 735 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1984).
"' 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
20
1 Id. at 1038-39.
201 Id. at 1033-34. The court made it clear that the basis for its decision was the fact
that the Supreme Court in NebraskaPress had refused to issue a per se rule against the
constitutionality of prior restraint orders in fair trial cases. Id. at 1034. The court stated
that even though the Supreme Court had held that prior restraints come to the courts with
a heavy presumption against their validity and that not once had a federal court upheld
one yet, "[t]his does not mean, however, that there is no situation in which a prior
restraint on the press is justified. Among the very narrow range of cases which may
justify a restraint are those involving a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial." Id. at
1033-34. This reasoning is again well explained by the court in its opinion deciding that
the tapes did not contain any information that would affect the defendant's right to a fair
trial. See id.at 1050. Here the court described CNN's argument as resting on an absolutist
view that prior restraints are per se unconstitutional under the First Amendment because
it refused to allow the court to undertake the balancing required by NebraskaPress,while
the Supreme Court had already rejected the argument that prior restraints would be per
se unconstitutional. Id. The court concluded: "Keeping in mind that prior restraints are

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 84

as in some of the cases discussed above, the court issued a temporary
restraining order postponing broadcast of the tapes and ordering CNN to
produce them so that the court could decide whether a permanent
injunction should be issued. The judge was careful, however, to
distinguish his action from a restraining order. He explained that he was
only trying to maintain the "status quo" until the evidence was reviewed
2 The court
and the Nebraska Press standard applied. 02
concluded that
CNN's arguments were inherently contradictory because, on the one
hand, CNN demanded findings to determine the validity of the injunction
while denying the court the evidence needed to make the determination.2 °3 The court of appeals upheld the decision, but not under a prior

restraint standard." 4 Even though this was the first time that a federal
court had allowed a prior restraint to stand, the Supreme Court denied
review over the strong dissent of Justices Marshall and O'Connor." 5
presumptively unconstitutional and are the measure of last resort, the court is nevertheless
requiredto undertake this constitutionalbalancing."Id. at 1050 (emphasis added).
202 See id. at 1036; see also United States v. Noriega (In re Cable News Network),
917 F.2d 1543, 1546 (1 lth Cir.), cert. deniedsub. nom Cable News Network v. Noriega,
498 U.S. 976 (1990). The judge justified his reasoning in his written opinion rejecting the
requested injunction after reviewing the tapes:
The court emphasizes again that its temporary restraint on the broadcast of
Noriega's attorney-client conversations was not a determination on the merits
- the court had not then concluded that Noriega's Sixth Amendment right to
a fair trial outweighed CNN's First Amendment right to be free of prior
restraints on publication, nor even that Noriega's right to a fair trial would be
harmed by disclosure of his attorney-client conversations. Rather, the court's
orders were entered for the very limited purpose of maintaining the status quo
until the court could determine whether this was one of the narrow class of
cases in which a prior restraint might be justified.
United
States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1051 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
203
Id. at 1049.
204 United States v. Noriega (In re Cable News Network), 917 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir.),
cert. deniedsub. nom Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990). The court
concluded that "the District Court must delineatecarefullyitsreasons for proscribing the
broadcast of the tapes in question, guided by the three considerations of Press-Enterprise
I."Id. at 1550. Inexplicably, the court analyzed the Supreme Court cases that recognized
a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials, see supranote 13, and balanced this
interest with the state interest in protecting the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. This
was not the correct analysis to use in this case, because the issue was not one of access
to the trial but one of prior restraint under NebraskaPress.See RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992); Lance R. Peterson, A FirstAmendment Sixth Amendment Dilemma: Manuel NoriegaPushesthe American JudicialSystem to the
Outer Limits of the FirstAmendment, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 563 (1992).
205 In his dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice O'Connor, concluded that this case provided a good opportunity to
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Following the reasoning in Noriega, it may be argued that the use of
temporary restraining orders to allow the courts to decide the validity of
the requested orders to ban publication is a good compromise. Courts
would be allowed to protect the defendants by banning publication
temporarily. Yet, this argument is flawed for several reasons. First, the
Supreme Court in Near decided that, to determine whether a judicial
order was a prior restraint, courts must examine the effect of the order
and not its title or character. 6 The effect of a temporary order is to
suppress speech indefinitely. According to Near and other prior restraint
jurisprudence, this has the effect of a prior restraint. Indeed, a temporary
order meets the four elements used by some courts to define a prior
restraint: the order restrains specified expression, it must be obeyed until
reversed, the violation of the order may be punished as contempt, and the

proceedings conducted for its violation do not include all the safeguards
of a criminal trial, including the fact that the violator cannot rgue the

constitutionality of the order as a defense for its violation. 0 7
reexamine the prior restraint doctrine. Evaluating the facts of the case, he concluded that
the courts below erred in granting a prior restraint when the petitioner did not meet the
heavy burden of proof required to defeat the presumption of invalidity of a prior restraint.
The dissenting opinion is short and poignant. Here it is reproduced in full:
The issue raised by this petition is whether a trial court may enjoin
publication of information alleged to threaten a criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial without any threshold showing that the information will indeed cause
such harm and that suppression is the only means of averting it. The District
Court in this case entered an order enjoining petitioner Cable News Network
(CNN) from broadcasting taped communications between respondent Manuel
Noriega, a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, and his counsel. The
court entered this order without any finding that suppression of the broadcast
was necessary to protect Noriega's right to a fair trial, reasoning that no such
determination need be made unless CNN surrendered the tapes for the court's
inspection. The Court of Appeals affirmed this conclusion.
In my view, this case is of extraordinary consequence for freedom of the
press. Our precedents make unmistakably clear that "'[a]ny prior restraint on
expression comes to this Court with a "heavy presumption" against its
constitutional validity,' "and that the proponent of this drastic remedy" 'carries
a heavy burden of showing justification for [its] imposition."' I do not see how
the prior restraint imposed in this case can be reconciled with these teachings.
Even more fundamentally, if the lower courts in this case are correct in their
remarkable conclusion that publication can be automatically restrained pending
application of the demanding test established by NebraskaPress,then I think
it is imperative that we reexamine the premises and operation of NebraskaPress
itself. I would grant the stay application and the petition for certiorari.
Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976, 976-77 (1990) (citations omitted).
206 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708-09 (1931).
27
See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975); see

300
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Moreover, the news value of the information may be lost while the
restraining order is in place, as it may take several days for a court to
make a ruling and for the appeals process. 08 Thus, the public does not

receive the information to which it is entitled, when it is entitled to it.
Time is of the essence in the news publishing business. The press must

be allowed to publish the news quickly enough for it to effectively check
abuses of governmental power.2" 9 Otherwise, the basis for the checks
also supra note 41.
20.See,

e.g., CBS v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 915 (1994) (delay of 15 days); In re

Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1990) (delay of one week); In re King World
Productions, 898 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990) (delay of eight days); CBS v. U.S. District
Court, 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1984) (delay of one day); Clear Channel Communications,
Inc. v. Murray, 636 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (delay of six and a half
months); Times Publishing Co. v. Florida, 632 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(delay of five months and ten days); Florida Publishing Co. v. Brooke, 576 So. 2d 842
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (delay of four months and five days); Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Morphonios, 467 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (delay of twenty-five
days); State ax rel.Chillicothe Gazette, Inc. v. Ross County Court of Common Pleas, 442
N.E.2d 747 (Ohio 1982) (delay of five weeks); KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513
(Utah 1983) (delay of four days). The two most recent examples of unjustified prior
restraints exemplify the dangers inherent in allowing courts to issue restraining orders
against the media. Paula Jones, for example, who has sued President Bill Clinton for
sexual harassment, asked for an order banning the publication of nude photographs of her
by Penthousemagazine. On that same day, District Court Judge Peter Leisure granted a
temporary restraining order halting publication and distribution of the magazine. Seven
media organizations joined Penthouse as amici. The press was forced to prepare for and
participate in a lengthy hearing and the news was delayed for two days until the court
lifted its order and denied the request by Jones. Jones v. Turner, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). More recently, Judge John Feikens, of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, imposed a permanent injunction on the publishers of
Business Week restraining them from using certain information leaked to them by an
attorney. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735, 1995 WL 592280
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 1995). The information had been filed under seal in a civil claim to
which Business Week was not a party. Id. at *1. The court first issued a temporary
restraining order just three hours before the magazine's deadline for publication. Id. at * 1;
Linda Himelstein, The Story Behind the Bankers Trust Story, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 2,
1995, at 58. The order, which was entered without notice to the publisher, had no
deadline. Claudia MacLachlan, DidBusinessWeekFold Too Easily?,NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23,
1995, at Al, A21. It prevented publication for three weeks, when there was a hearing and
the court entered the permanent order. See Deirdre Carmody, High Court Will Not Lift
MagazineBan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at A7. During those three weeks, Business
Week sought relief from both the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and from
Supreme Court Justice Stevens in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit. Both
denied jurisdiction in the matter until the district court had a chance to hold a hearing.
McGraw-Hill Companies v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6, 7 (U.S. 1995).
209 In NebraskaPress,the Court recognized that the traditional function of the media
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and balances on governmental action and the protection of the defendants' rights by assuring openness are defeated. The result in the long run
is a dangerous chilling effect on the press. The press may decide it is not
worth the fight or the wait to get information published after it has lost
its value.
For these reasons, any delay of publication, for even minimal periods

of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury to the news media.
As such, it is presumptively invalid."' Given that the press is expected

to be the watchdog of the judicial process," this seems to be too much
of a threat to freedom of the press. Justice Harlan, for example, once
wrote: "It is vital to the operation of democratic government that the
citizens have facts and ideas on important issues before them. A delay of

even a day or two may be of crucial importance in some instances. 212

More recently, Justice Blackmun, serving as a circuit judge, declared a
restraining order unconstitutional as a prior restraint because it led to an
indefinite delay of a broadcast which would cause "irreparable 2harm to

the news media that is intolerable under the First Amendment. M
Much has been written about the Supreme Court's denial of review
2 14 The decision to deny review was a mistake, but it should
in Noriega.

is to report the news promptly. Nebraska Press Ass'nv. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
Delays in publication can "destroy the contemporary news value of the information the
press seeks to disseminate." Id. at 609 (Brennan, J., concurring).
210 CBS v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 915 (1994) (holding delay of broadcast will cause
irreparable harm to news media); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); New York
Times v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (per
curiam) (Black, J., concurring) (holding that every delay in lifting the injunctions against
the newspapers is a continuing violation of the First Amendment).
211 See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
212 A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
213 CBS v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 915 (1994). In this case a state court in South
Dakota entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting CBS from airing a video of the
practices at the petitioners' meat processing plant. Blackmun stayed the injunction,
concluding that the petitioner had not met the heavy burden to defeat the presumption
against the constitutional validity of a prior restraint. Id. at 914-15.
214 Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990). See Floyd Abrams et al.,
The Noriega Tapes: Was it Right to TemporarilyBan theirBroadcast?:No, the Wrong
Standard Was Applied, 77 A.B.A. J. 37 (1991) (concluding that it was the government's
interception of the tapes that frustrated the attorney-client privilege, not the broadcaster's
telecast); Martha A. Overland, PriorRestraint Upheld, CNN's Tough Stance Leads to
Supreme CourtLoss, 77 A.B.A. J. 19 (1991) (stating that reports of the death of the First
Amendment in this case are greatly overstated); Peterson, supra note 204, at 579-80
n.123; James Rubin, CNN-Noriega Tapes Ruling Harms PressFreedom,Advocates Say,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 19, 1990, at 1; Peter Schrag, NoriegaCaseThreatensAmerica
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not have been a surprise. It was the result of the unworkable standard
created in NebraskaPress. The decisions of the lower courts in Noriega,
in a genuine effort to apply the Nebraska Press standard, condoned the
use of temporary restraining orders to postpone publication. Such a forced
delay of publication was a direct infringement on freedom of the press.
The presumption against the validity of the order and the burden of proof
needed to overcome it should not have been diminished by the temporary
character of the ban on publication. 15 In summary, any temporary ban
like the one used in Noriega is a prior restraint issued to determine
whether to issue a prior restraint." 6
VIII.

CONTEMPT POWER AND THE EFFECT
OF THE COLLATERAL BAR RULE

When confronting a restraining order, one alternative for the press
could be simply to disregard the order and attack its constitutionality in
court. This was CNN's plan in the Noriega incident. Unfortunately, in
most cases this is a very risky decision to make. Indeed, CNN was found
in contempt of court. 217 As opposed to cases of prohibition of publication by a statute imposing a fine or a criminal conviction, in the case of
a restraining order the press cannot violate the order and then argue that
the order constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. Generally, a court
order must be obeyed until it is reversed. 1 8 If it is not obeyed, the
order may not be attacked as unconstitutional in a subsequent contempt
proceeding. In such a proceeding, the only issue is whether the publisher
knowingly violated the order. The constitutionality of the court order is
not in dispute and would not have an effect on the finding of contempt.
More than the DictatorHimselfEverDid,L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 19, 1990, at 6; Schweiker,
supra note 188, at 375; Kenneth Starr et al., The Noriega Tapes: Was it Right to
TemporarilyBan Their Broadcast?:Yes, The OrderWas Constitutional,77 A.B.A. J. 36
(1991) (explaining that the First Amendment is part of the rule of law, not above it).
2 5
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). See, e.g., Florida v.
Lopez, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1574 (Fla. Cir. Ct.), cert. deniedsub nom. DeJesus
Lopez v. Florida, 621 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (taking pains to distinguish
Noriega to deny a requested temporary restraining order).
216 See Peterson, supra note 204, at 584-85.
217 United States v. Cable News Network, 865 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(holding that CNN knowingly and wilfully violated the court's restraining order).
211 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313 (1967); United States v.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 509 (5th Cir. 1972) (ruling that an injunction must be obeyed,
irrespective of the validity of the order).
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This "collateral bar rule' ' 219 limits the possibilities of the press in confronting a court order enjoining publication of trial information. The

effect of this "rule" is to force the publisher to relinquish its First
Amendment rights while it waits for a court decision.22 ° Yet, its validity
22
has been affirmed repeatedly. '
It is usually stated that the collateral bar rule is needed to protect the
integrity of the judicial system. 2 ' The rule is conceived to promote the
authority of the courts because the deliberate disregard of a court order
would subvert the independence of the judiciary, and its ability to
29

For a discussion of this rule, see Paul W. Butler, Defining the "Transparently

Invalid" Exception to the CollateralBar Rule, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 311 (1987);
Christine Hasiotis, ConstitutionalLaw-Transparently Invalid Order Exception to the
CollateralBar Rule Under the FirstAmendment in the FederalCourts, 21 SUFFOLK U.
L. Rnv. 265 (1987); Richard E. Labunski, The "CollateralBar" Rule and the First
Amendment: The ConstitutionalityofEnforcing UnconstitutionalOrders, 37 AM. U. L.
REv. 323 (1988); K. McGinn, Zal v. Steppe: Ninth CircuitApprovalofan In LimineBan
of Specific Words, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 35, 38 (1993); Hal S. Shapiro, The
CollateralBar Rule - TransparentlyInvalid: A Theoreticaland HistoricalPerspective,
24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 561, 566 (1991).
At least one court has referred to the rule as "the federal rule." See Glen v. Hongisto,
438 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (distinguishingthe rule applied in federal courts
with In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1978) (en bane) (holding that in the state of
California a contempt conviction will not be upheld if the underlying order is unconstitutional)). However, the collateral bar rule is also generally accepted in most state
jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 887 P.2d 681 (Kan. 1994) (concluding that a
criminal contempt conviction can be affirmed even though the underlying order is later
shown to be unconstitutional); State v. Cherryhomes, 840 P.2d 1261 (N.M. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that defendant must comply with an order even if it is subject to being set
aside as unconstitutional).
0 The rule has been used to affirm contempt convictions in cases where the original
court order arguably abridged First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 316 (1967) (order banning demonstration); United States v.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding a newspaper in contempt of court for
violating a temporary restraining order that was later found unconstitutional); Taylor v.
Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., 651 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (order banning communication with client); People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 527
N.E.2d 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding contempt conviction valid even though underlying
injunction was reversed as a prior restraint); State v. Cherryhomes, 840 P.2d 1261 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that defendant must comply with order even if it is subject to
being set aside as an unconstitutional restriction on free expression).
2' See, e.g., supra note 220; ExpartePurvis v. Local Union No. 1317, 382 So. 2d
512, 514 (Ala. 1980); State v. Chavez, 601 P.2d 301, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Mead
School Dist. v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 534 P.2d 561,565 (Wash. 1975), all citedinLabunski,
supra note 219, at 327 n.15.
222 Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21.
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discharge its responsibilities.2 23 In Walker v. City of Birmingham,22 4
for example, the Supreme Court for the first time upheld the use of the
collateral bar rule in a case where the order imposed by the trial court
affected First Amendment rights and would "unquestionably be subject
' The lower court in Walker had
to substantial constitutional question."225
issued an injunction which prohibited a march in the city of Birmingham.
Dr. Martin Luther King and many others marched in violation of the
order and were held in contempt of court.22 6 Even though the Supreme
Court admitted that it had grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the
order, it upheld the convictions.227 The Court ruled that the petitioners
should have appealed the order and argued its constitutionality before
violating it.22 The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the contempt
convictions should be set aside because of the alleged invalidity of the
order.229 The Court held that the collateral bar rule is needed to maintain order in our system of government because "respect for judicial
process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law."23
This willingness to uphold the validity of the collateral bar rule, even
in cases where First Amendment rights are involved and the order is of
dubious validity, places the press in a very difficult position."' When
facing a court's prior restraint order, the press has two options: it can
comply with the order and thus be forced not to publish until the order
is reversed; or it can disobey it, exercise its First Amendment rights, and
then suffer the consequences of a subsequent contempt conviction. In
other words, the rule forces the publisher to choose between a waiver of
its constitutional rights or an almost certain conviction for contempt. The
223

Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 510.

224 388 U.S. 307
2
2 1Id. at 317.
226 Id.
22 7

(1967).

at 307.

Id. at 321.

2'
29

Id. at 320.

2 Id.
230 _Id.
231

at 321.

The situation would be different if the publisher were facing a statute that acts as

a prior restraint. The press is not forced to comply with a statute it believes to be an
unconstitutional prior restraint. The press can ignore it, engage in the exercise of its First
Amendment rights, and then allege the unconstitutionality of the statute during the ensuing
trial. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). Thus, the press is
guaranteed a chance to argue the validity of the statute before it is punished for breaking
it. For example, in Shuttlesworth, which arose out of the same facts as Walker, the
Supreme Court reversedthe convictions ofthe demonstrators imposedunder the ordinance
because in this case the issue was the constitutionality of the ordinance itself and not of
the court order. Id. at 151.

1995-96]

PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON THE MEDIA

prospect of a certain contempt action with no constitutional defense
creates a strong incentive to obey the order. The court's contempt power,
therefore, can create a strong incentive for the publisher to comply with
an unconstitutional prior restraint order that should not have been issued
in the first place.
Although courts have recognized exceptions to the collateral bar

rule,232 these exceptions do not provide much relief to the press. In
Walker, the Court acknowledged that a litigant can challenge the

constitutionality of an order if the order was issued without jurisdiction.233 In dictum, the Court also suggested that an exception may be
recognized for cases where the order is "transparently invalid" or has "a
frivolous pretense to validity, 234 and an attempt to have the order
reviewed had been met with delay or frustration.235 The Court, howev-

er, did not explain this possible exception nor the circumstances in which
it could be applied.236
Only one other court, however, has applied the exception to cases
where the injunctions affect First Amendment rights.237 In In re Provi-

2See In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (1st Cir. 1986)

(recognizing transparently invalid orders as exceptions to the collateral bar rule), modified
820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,485U.S. 693 (1988); PhoenixNewspapers,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594, 597 (Ariz. 1966) (noting that a court order
prohibiting publication of events at a judicial hearing violated the Arizona Constitution,
rendering the court order void); In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273, 280 (Cal. 1980) (en bane)
(holding that contempt cannot exist where the order is constitutionally void on its face,
though not transparently invalid); Fitchburg v. 707 Main Corp., 343 N.E.2d 149, 154
(Mass. 1976) (holding ordinance unconstitutionally vague on its face cannot sustain
contempt); State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984) (reversing contempt convictions for
violation of an order prohibiting the broadcast of tape recordings that had already been
played in open court because the order was a patently invalid prior restraint); State ex rel.
Superior Court v. Sperry, 483 P.2d 608, 613 (Wash. 1971) (stating that the contempt
order violated was transparently invalid), cert. denied,404 U.S. 939 (1971). See generally
Labunski, supra note 219, for a discussion of the rule and its exception.
3'Walker, 388 U.S. at 314.
24
1 Id. at 315.
235
Id. at 318.
" In fact, in a later case the Court seemed to contradict this dictum. In Carroll v.
President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), the Court held that a litigant could not
challenge the constitutionality of a court order as a defense if he disobeyed it "no matter
how well-founded their doubts might be as to its validity." Id. at 179. Adding to the
confusion is the fact that the Supreme Court has allowed some litigants to challenge the
constitutionality of court orders after disobeying the orders without mentioning the
collateral bar rule. See, e.g., Manessv. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
237 See cases cited supra note 232.
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dence Journal Co.,238 for example, the court applied the exception
suggested in dictum in Walker for cases where the court order is
"transparently invalid." '39 The son of a reputed figure in organized
crime had sued the Journal,alleging that the FBI had wrongly released
the surveillance record of his father and requested a temporary restraining
order prohibiting dissemination of the information. The district court
granted the motion and set a date for a hearing to determine whether to
vacate the order.24 ° Before the hearing, the Journal published a story
based on the surveillance record and was found in contempt of court.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. It held that the
original order was a transparently invalid prior restraint, and therefore
the Journal could challenge its constitutionality by violating it. 4 '
After a rehearing en banc, however, the court modified the opinion. It
held that, for the exception to apply, the publisher must make a "good
faith effort" to seek emergency relief from the appellate court, "even
when it thinks it is the subject of a transparently unconstitutional
'
order of prior restraint."242
Only if the publisher could not get timely
access to appellate relief, or if a timely decision was not forthcoming,
could the publisher violate the order and then challenge its constitutionality in the contempt proceedings.24 3 The Supreme Court later
dismissed a certiorari petition,2 " leaving the decision of the First
Circuit unaffected.
Although Walker and Providence Journal have recognized the
"transparently invalid" order exception to the collateral bar rule, they do
not provide much guidance on how to apply it. Other than lack of
jurisdiction, there are no established standards that would help ajournalist
recognize a transparently invalid order. In fact, the court in Providence
Journalheld that the line between a transparently invalid order and one
238 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that a party subject to a transparently

invalid prior restraint on pure speech may challenge that order by violating it), modified
820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,485 U.S. 693 (1988).
'2 9 In re ProvidenceJournalCo., 820 F.2d at 1346-47 (citing Walker v. City of
Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967)).
240
Id. at 1345.
241 Id. at 1353.
241 Id. at 1355. This may also be the result of the interpretation of other dictum in
Walker, where the Supreme Court suggested that the decision in that case could be
different "if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it in the
Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or frustration of their constitutional claims."
Walker, 388 U.S. at 318.
143 In re ProvidenceJournalCo., 820 F.2d at 1355.
244485 U.S. 693 (1988).
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that is merely invalid is not always distinct and that there should be a
heavy presumption in favor of the validity of the order.245 Therefore,
the court held that the collateral bar rule should be applied if the order
had any pretense to validity at the time it was issued.24 6 To determine
this, a court would have to go through a fact-specific inquiry, wholly
within the court's discretion.247
The exception for transparently invalid orders is, therefore, an
acceptable means to limit the power of the collateral bar rule, but it is not
a viable solution to the dilemma faced by publishers when confronted
with prior restraint orders. As interpreted, the exception does not provide
clear guidance for publishers, and it requires an attempt at appellate
relief. Because timeliness of the news is an important element in
journalism, the press would still face the same difficult decisions before
publication. In most cases, the prior restraint will be invalidated on
appeal. But, according to Walker, a contempt conviction may stand even
if it is based on an unconstitutional injunction.248 If there is any pretense of validity, the order must be obeyed and, given the lack of
guidelines to determine exactly when the order should be obeyed, the
press at best would be taking a risk if it decides to publish. Therefore, for
the publisher, the question of what will happen on appeal is not as
important as the dilemma of what to do about the order that prevents it
from publishing the news.
If the order is not violated, the news may never be published.
Therefore, to avoid suppression of the information, the publisher would
first have to determine whether the order is transparently invalid, a
determination for which there are no clear standards. Then it would have
to attempt to secure appellate relief. While waiting for relief, it would
then have to decide whether to take the risk of violating the order as
CNN did in Noriega.249 Yet, the publisher cannot be certain that the
court of appeals will determine that the order is transparently invalid.
Providence Journaldid not hold that the publisher could not be held in
contempt if it follows this process. 2 0 It only held that if the court finds
that the order is transparently invalid, the publisher could challenge its

24

1In re ProvidenceJournal Co., 820 F.2d at 1347.

246

247

Id.
Id. See also United States v. Dickinson 465 F.2d 496, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1972);

Dunn v. United States, 388 F.2d 511, 513 (10th Cir. 1968).
248 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
249 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
oIn re ProvidenceJournalCo., 820 F.2d at 1353.
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constitutionality during the contempt proceeding.2 1' The resulting
uncertainty forces the publisher to make difficult decisions.
Once again, Noriega is the best example of the problem. 2 2 There,
the broadcaster was found guilty of criminal contempt even though the
court concluded that the primary reason for the violation of the court
order was the fact that CNN truly believed it was transparently invalid.2 3 This exemplifies the dilemma of the press. The broadcaster made

251

Id.

252

Actually there is another very good example, but it does not involve the claim of

lack of a fair trial. In a case that is still pending as this Article goes to press, the
publishers of the magazine Business Week were faced with the dilemma of suppressing
a story and complying with an order, or challenging it and risking contempt. Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-1-94-735, 1995 WL 592280 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3,
1995). They decided to suppress the story and the court eventually permanently banned
them from publishing it. Id. at *7.
On September 12, 1995, Business Week received a copy of an amended complaint
filed under seal by Procter and Gamble against Bankers Trust Co. in the District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio. MacLachlan, supranote 208. The next day, just a few
hours before the magazine's deadline to publish a story based on the complaint, both
parties in the action jointly requested an order prohibiting publication. Without any
attempt to contact the publishers of Business Week, U.S. District Court Judge John
Feikens entered the order. Id. Given the lack of clear guidelines as to whether the media
can challenge the constitutionality of the order by violating it, Business Week decided to
hold the story and appeal the order. Id. Both the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and Supreme Court Justice Stevens, as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, denied
the appeals onjurisdictional grounds. McGraw-Hill Companies v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
116 S. Ct. 6 (U.S. 1995). The case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing. Id. at
7. By this point, the story had been delayed three weeks, and after the hearing held on
October 3, it was banned permanently. Business Week has appealed, but given that the
information in question became part of the public record and could be used to write other
stories, the issue may be dismissed as moot. MacLachlan, supranote 208.
This case exemplifies the dilemmas and the risks created by the confusing state of
prior restraint doctrine today. The publisher did not know how to react to the court order
and consequently gave up the issue entirely. The public never got to see the original story.
At first sight the order seemed to be a "transparently invalid" prior restraint. It was issued
without notice to the publisher who was not even a party to the litigation, there was no
threat to the fairness of the trial, and the circumstances did not comply with any of the
exceptions recognized by Near v. Minnesota.Yet, the publisher was not confident enough
to violate the rule because the risk of a contempt conviction was too high. In the end, the
combination of confusion about the doctrine and the contempt power of the court resulted
not in a mere chilling of the speech in question, but in its total suppression- precisely
what the prior restraint doctrine should help prevent.
253 United States v. Cable News Network, 865 F. Supp. 1549, 1559, 1561, 1563 (S.D.
Fla. 1994). In the trial for contempt, CNN personnel testified that it "would never
intentionally violate the order of a court." David Lyons, CNNArguesIts Side on Noriega
JailTapes, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 1994, at A12. The CNN legal advisors testified that, at
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the correct analysis, reached the right conclusion,"' yet it was found
guilty of contempt for exercising its constitutional rights and for trusting
the unworkable standards created by the courts."' 5 The burden on
freedom of the press is, therefore, obvious. Whenever there is a risk of

the time, they fully expected the court of appeals to reverse the prior restraint order issued
by the district court. Id. In its decision the court stated:
A review of the testimony and the exhibits makes it rather clear that CNN's
attorneys felt that this court's orders were unconstitutional and that pursuant to
the teaching of ProvidenceJournalthey could ignore the order and avoid
contempt if, indeed, they were as right as they thought they were. They were
not right and now cannot avoid the consequences by shifting the emphasis for
their decision.
CableNews Network, 865 F. Supp. at 1559 (footnote omitted).
"4 After all, the court in ProvidenceJournalstated that when "the prior restraint
impinges upon the right of the press to communicate news and involves expression in the
form of pure speech - speech not connected with any conduct - the presumption of
unconstitutionality is virtually insurmountable." 820 F.2d 1342, 1348 (1st Cir. 1986),
modified 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert.dismissed,485 U.S. 693 (1988) (footnote
omitted).
255 CNN faced possible fines of up to $100,000, but was given the choice of issuing
a public apology and reimbursing $85,000 in legal fees. It chose to apologize and pay the
fees. Lyons, supra note 253, at A12. Yet, the lack of a harsher penalty does not diminish
the importance of the issues involved. Compare State v. Alston, 887 P.2d 681 (Kan.
1994), where the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed a contempt order issued against the
press for violating a clearly unconstitutional prior restraint. There, after granting a motion
to suppress evidence of a defendant's prior criminal record, the trial judge in open court
ordered the press not to report this evidence. Id. at 684. After attempting to contact the
judge and its attorneys, a local newspaper published a story stating that the defendant had
a criminal record. The newspaper's editor later declared that he believed the order was
an invalid prior restraint. See Contempt Conviction of Paper,Publisherfor Violating
Judge's Gag OrderOverturned,NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 1994, at 11. The next day, the
judge ordered a change of venue, concluding that the defendant could not receive a fair
trial and, after a hearing, found the editor and the newspaper guilty of criminal contempt.
Id. The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the original order banning publication was
an unconstitutional prior restraint under the NebraskaPress standard and that, given the
good faith efforts of the press to seek appellate review before its publishing deadline on
the same day, it did not have to wait for a court to reverse the order before violating it.
Alston, 887 P.2d at 691. The court cautioned that only when timely review is not available
or when the order is transparently invalid may the press publish in violation of the order
and wait until the contempt proceeding to challenge it. Id. at 690. The court also stated
that the press must be ready to document all steps taken to seek relief. Id. Cases like this
one are encouraging because they depict an understanding of how the law should be
interpreted and applied. However, they offer little help to the press in making its
prepublication decisions. The standards are still the same but the decisions are unpredictable, which means the only thing the press knows for sure is that it takes a big risk when
deciding to publish in violation of an order. See also cases cited supra note 232.
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future retaliation on the publisher there is a risk of a chilling effect on the
press. The risk may lead the publisher to decide to avoid the problem of
challenging the injunction altogether by not publishing.
Temporary restraining orders are, therefore, as objectionable as
permanent injunctions. Unless the petitioner of the order meets the very
heavy burden of proof required at the precise moment the petition is
made, even temporary restrictions on the publication of protected speech
should not be tolerated. The net effect of a temporary order is the same
as that of an injunction. The publication is banned and there is a strong
chilling effect on the press, while the court becomes a censor exercising
discretion to determine what information should be published. This is the
"essence of censorship" rejected by the Supreme Court in Near.25 6 This
author finds no justification for this infringement on freedom of the press.
The press should be protected from this type of intrusion to be able to
perform its function. The best solution is to ban the use of court orders
restraining information about ongoing trials. Such orders are impermissible prior restraints that should not be considered by the courts as
solutions to the problems created by pretrial publicity.

IX. THE EFFECrivENESS OF PRIOR RESTRAINT ORDERS
There is another reason for not using prior restraints in the fair trial
context." 7 The Nebraska Press standard is based on the notion that
publicity has an effect over possible jurors and therefore threatens the
defendant's rights to a fair trial. To defeat the presumption of unconstitutionality the petitioner must show that the restraining order will be
effective in eliminating this effect and the threat to a fair trial. Yet, the
evidence on the effect of pretrial publicity on potential jurors is, at best,
inconclusive. Some studies have shown that jurors are affected by pretrial
256

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931).

" Actually, there are two other reasons. The second one is the argument that the
value of the speech is diminished when it is interfered with by a prior restraint order, even
if the order is later lifted. See Blasi, supranote 50, at 67-68. It has been hypothesized that
even if the message is ultimately transmitted to the public, the temporary ban affects the
trust relationship between the public and the press. Id. at 63-66. The audience may doubt
that the published information is the true original message and may wonder whether it has
been edited to placate the censor. Id. at 67. Additionally, the lifting of the ban may be
perceived as an official seal of approval eliminating some of the impact of the
information. Id. Moreover, the publicity of the litigation regarding the ban may displace
the contents of the communication as a news item. Id. at 68. In fact, in Noriega, the
discussion of irregularities in the government's conduct in taping Noriega's confidential
communications was lost in the debate about the prior restraint issue.
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publicity and that some of the traditional remedies, such as instructions
by the court, are not effective in eliminating this effect. For example, the
studies performed by the "Free Press - Fair Trial Project" in the early
1970s of ten panels of jurors led to the conclusion that exposure to
prejudicial pretrial publicity would double the chance of a guilty
verdict.258 However, the use of voir dire helped a little in controlling
juror prejudice. Without voir dire, seventy-eight percent of the jurors who
had been exposed to prejudicial publicity voted for a guilty verdict. After
jury selection with
voir dire, sixty-nine percent of those jurors voted for
25 9
verdict.
a guilty
The studies that have claimed to find clear evidence of prejudicial
effect, however, have been criticized as inconclusive and ineffective in
determining the relationship between news coverage and jury influence. 26 One researcher, for example, has criticized that most jury
studies do not use real jurors as subjects, that the setting of the studies is
not a real trial and that the findings of effect of publicity on jurors are
inaccurate because certain types of people are more predisposed to
influence from outside sources. 26 ' Jury studies cannot use real criminal
proceedings and therefore cannot produce in the experimental jurors the
sense of responsibility that real jurors might feel.262 Also, the experimental exposure is not diffused through competition with other messages
experienced in real life, such as television, radio, and newspapers.
Finally, many studies have relied on survey methodology which does not
clearly link pretrial publicity and jury decision-making.26 3
Moreover, many studies have concluded that pretrial publicity does
not have as much prejudicial effect on jurors and that there is little
correlation between guilty verdicts and prejudicial publicity.2 4 Based

" Alice M. Padawer-Singer & Allen H. Barton, The Impact ofPretrialPublicityon
Jurors' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 123, 135 (1975).
259 Id.
26

Robb M. Jones, The LatestEmpiricalStudieson PretrialPublicity,
JuryBias, and
JudicialRemedies - Not Enough to Overcome the FirstAmendment Right ofAccess to
PretrialHearings,40 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 844 (1991).
261Rita J. Simon, Does the Court'sDecision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the
Research Evidence on the Impact on JurorsofNews Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 515,
517, 520 (1977). See also Schmidt, supra note 142, at 448.
262 Schmidt, supranote 142, at 448.
263
See Amy L. Otto et al., The Biasing Impact of PretrialPublicity on Juror
Judgments, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 453, 455 (1994).
264
See F. Gerald Klein & Paul H. Jess, PrejudicialPublicity: Its Effects on Law
School Mock Juries,43 JOURNALISM Q. 113 (1966), cited in Scott A. Hagan, KUTV v.
Wilkinson: Another Episode in the FairTrial/FreePressSaga, UTAH L. REv. 739, 752-
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on a study conducted at the University of Minnesota, for example,
researchers concluded that even though pretrial publicity does affect
subjects' initial judgments, the evidence suggested that the problems
created by pretrial publicity are diminished by the trial itself.26 The
study results showed that "different pretrial publicity manipulations
'
produced effects of different magnitude."266
The largest effects were
found to be when the negative pretrial publicity involved the defendant's
character.267 This type of pretrial publicity made subjects more likely
to say that the defendant was guilty prior to trial.268 However, while the
pretrial publicity may have had significant effects upon the subjects'
pretrial judgments, the trial itself diminished greatly any effect of the
pretrial publicity.269 Of the five pretrial publicity manipulations, not a
single one had "significant direct effects on subjects' posttrial verdicts. 270
At least two other studies have found that the proportion of jurors
voting for a guilty verdict was virtually the same in a group of jurors that
had been exposed to sensationalistic news accounts as in a group that had
not been exposed to the news after they were both instructed by the court
to disregard the publicity 7' Another study showed that although the
experimental jurors were influenced by the publicity to which they were
exposed, most of them changed their minds after the trial process and
voted for not guilty verdicts. The researcher interpreted this result to
mean that the jurors took the judge's instructions seriously and were able
53 (1985); Simon, supranote 261, at 528 & n.60. For a discussion of these studies, see
also Drechsel, supranote 67, at 14-15; Jones, supra note 260, at 844; John Kaplan, Of
Babies and Bathwater,29 STAN. L. REv. 621, 623 (1976-1977) (using surveys of actual
jurors to conclude that "newspaper publicity, or any other assertions of the facts of a case
made outside of court, have virtually no impact upon the jury trying the case"); Otto et
al., supranote 263, at 453. The Report of the ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial
and Free Press (the Reardon Report) states: "There are no determinative empirical data
that will supply ready answers to the questions of whether jurors can put aside
preconceived opinions, and abide by judges' instructions to decide only the evidence on
the record," quoted in Schmidt, supra note 142, at 445.
265 Otto et al., supra note 263, at 464-66.
266
Id. at 464.
267
Id.
268 id.
269
2 70

Id. at 465.
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271 Simon, supranote 261, at 528 & n.60.
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to put the prejudicial material out of their minds.273 Using surveys of
actual jurors, another author has concluded that "newspaper publicity, or
any other assertions of the facts of a case made outside of court, have
virtually no impact upon the jury trying the case."' 74 One researcher has
summarized the evidence on this issue:
Experiments to date indicate that, for the most part, juries are able and
willing to put aside extraneous information and base their decisions on
the evidence. The results show that when ordinary citizens become
jurors, they assume a special role in which they apply different
standards of proof, more vigorous reasoning and greater detach27
ment. S
In conclusion, there seems to be little support for the balancing
approach prescribed by the court in Nebraska Press. The recognition of
a prior restraint in the fair trial context is based on the possible
prejudicial effect of publicity on prospective jurors. If the evidence does
not support that such a risk exists, there is no need for the proposed
remedy.
CONCLUSION
In cases where a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial seems to be
in jeopardy, the reasons for prior restraint of the press appear very
sensible, and the potential damage to the press seems minimal. Yet, the
end result of the prior restraint analysis in Nebraska Press was to leave
the door open for abuse of the system by allowing courts to tell the
media that it cannot publish truthful information about events of public
concern. This may be the increasing trend of a high number of unreported
cases, where a trial court issues a quick temporary injunction, only to lift
it or have an appellate court vacate it.276 This trend can lead to prior
restraints becoming easier to obtain than the standards of NebraskaPress
intended. Indeed, this was the result in Noriega.277 It seems that the
standard created by the court in Nebraska Press may have reached its
at 522-23.
Kaplan, supra note 264, at 623.
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Simon, supra note 261, at 528.

For examples of this trend, see Blackmun Lifts Gag on News Broadcast,NEWS
MEDIA & L., Winter 1994, at 25. For some of the reported cases, see supranote 160.
27 United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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limits and, as Justice Marshall and O'Connor have suggested, it is time
to re-examine it. 78
Noriegaitself best illustrates this need. There, the court order banning
publication of the information was issued to maintain "the status
27 9
quo."
Yet, the "status quo" should have been the recognition of a
presumption in favor of the publisher's rights. The court should have
protected the First Amendment right to publish until the party seeking the
injunction could meet the heavy burden to defeat the presumption of
invalidity of the injunction. The temporary restraining order and the order
to produce the tapes actually disrupted the status quo and impinged on
the exercise of the media's First Amendment rights. 28" As explained by
the court in ProvidenceJournal:
It is misleading in the context of daily newspaper publishing to argue
that a temporary restraining order merely preserves the status quo. The
status quo of daily newspapers is to publish news promptly that editors
decide to publish. A restraining order disturbs the status quo and
impinges on the exercise of editorial discretion.28 '
Even if one argues that there could be a case that meets the almost
insurmountable standard of Nebraska Press, there are many reasons that
support the claim for an absolute rule against prior restraints. First, it
seems that it is almost impossible to meet the standard. If the information
published in NebraskaPress was not enough to convince the Court that
the trial court would not be able to find twelve impartial jurors in a
community of 900 people, it is difficult to imagine that any court would
not be able to find jurors in any other case. Also, the standard calls for
certainty in the determination that twelve unbiased jurors cannot be
found." 2 Yet to answer that question, courts must inevitably engage in
speculation as to the extent and effects of the publicity. And, even if the
effect of the publicity is intense, the court can still apply other altema278 Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990) (Marshall and O'Connor,
JJ., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
279
Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 1051.
280In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1351 (1st Cir. 1986), modified820
F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,485 U.S. 693 (1988). See SMOLLA, supranote
43, at 399. See also Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978); and In re CBS,
Inc., 570 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v.
McKenzie, 735 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1984), for example, on the issue of orders to produce
evidence for review by the court.
281In re ProvidenceJournal Co., 820 F.2d at 1351.
282

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976).
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tives to eliminate its detrimental effects. Unfortunately, as long as the

door to prior restraints remains open, judges may feel compelled to
restrain the press to "preserve the status quo" while they decide whether
to issue a permanent injunction.

The creation of an absolute rule is also valid because the current
standard has led to the implementation of a dangerous system of abuse
and overuse of censorship by the courts that would infringe upon freedom
of the press. It has also resulted in delays in, or loss of, the publication
of information of public interest. The Supreme Court has stated that the

loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.. 3 The result of the

NebraskaPressprior restraint standard is that the First Amendment right
to publish, and the public's right to receive the information, are being
suppressed by courts that issue indefinite restraining orders as a first

resort against the press when they are not necessary or effective to
28 4
achieve their purpose.
In Near the Supreme Court stated that the press has a moral duty to

exercise its First Amendment rights with discretion.2 5 In Nebraska
Press, the Court added that the press also has a duty to promote the fair
administration of justice through the exercise of editorial selfrestraint.286 There is no doubt, however, that at times certain members

of the press have been irresponsible, disruptive, or reckless in their
reporting. In fact, in a system that affords protections to the press such
as those under the Constitution, this result is to be expected." 7 Therefore, if the press is going to act as a check on government in a democrat-

ic society, it must be afforded some liberty to make mistakes.

8

Just

283 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). See also CBS v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912,

914 2(1994);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
4
See supra note 160.
2' Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714, 715 (1931).
186

The Court stated:

The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry with them
something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights
responsibly - a duty widely acknowledged but not always observed by editors
and publishers. It is not asking too much to suggest that those who exercise
First Amendment rights in newspapers or broadcasting enterprises direct some
effort to protect the right of an accused to a fair trial by unbiased jurors.
Nebraska
Press,427 U.S. at 560.
27
1 See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press,26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (discussing the
Press Clause of the First Amendment).
288 In 1786 Madison recognized this need: "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from
the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the
press." 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876). This is the
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because there is the possibility of misuse, it does not follow that courts
should eliminate or limit the constitutionally protected rights of the press.
Although the press has at times acted irresponsibly, placing limits on the
exercise of First Amendment rights is not an acceptable way to eliminate
the irresponsible press.289
There is no real need for a balancing of interests approach to the
issues related to prior restraints in the fair trial context. The re-examination of the doctrine should lead to the adoption of an absolute rule against
the use of prior restraints as suggested by Justice Brennan in Nebraska
Press. 290 The ABA initially adopted such a rule for its Standards, but
recently abandoned it.29 It should be reinstated.
The advantages of a new absolute rule against prior restraints in the
fair trial context should be readily apparent. First, an absolute rule would
eliminate much groundless and expensive litigation. An absolute rule
would also eliminate the risk of a chilling effect and delays in the
publication of the information. Recognizing that the press should have a
right to publish does not mean that all information should be published.
The media must exercise self-control and good judgment in the selection
of the information it wishes to publish, but that decision must be left to
the press and not to the courts. Allowing the courts to make editorial
decisions comes dangerously close to an institutionalized system of
censorship, which is, at the very least, what the First Amendment was
enacted to prevent.

principle that inspired the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271,
272 (1964), where the Court created a new standard of fault in libel cases. The Court
concluded that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need
... to survive"' (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). Justice Potter
Stewart has also explained that "newspapers, television networks, and magazines have
sometimes been outrageously abusive, untruthful, arrogant, and hypocritical. But it hardly
follows that elimination of a strong and independent press is the way to eliminate
abusiveness,untruth, arrogance, or hypocrisy from government itself." Stewart, supranote
287,289
at 636.
See Stewart, supra note 287, at 636-37.
290 427 U.S. at 572-613.
291 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 8.30 (American BarAss'n 1978). See
supranotes 142-56 and accompanying text.

